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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay has two principal and overlapping purposes. The first is to
suggest a framework (reciprocal coaching to avoid false failure) for thinking
about the roles of mediators and parties that could help maximize their ability
to mine the full potential of mediation in civil cases. The second is to present
findings from social science research that support or shed light on, and can
be used to explain and assess, specific coaching suggestions.
Should mediators "coach" other participants during a mediation? Should
our thinking about how to answer this question depend, at least in part, on
how, under which circumstances, and for what purposes the coaching is
done? What are the "philosophic" and ethical issues that various forms of
coaching might raise? Can prospects for improving what a mediation delivers
to parties be improved by actively encouraging all participants to view
themselves not only as players, but also as coaches, and by asking all
participants to participate vigorously in both generating and assessing
coaching ideas? Is there reason, supplied by social science research, to
believe that such "reciprocal coaching" might improve the health and the
productivity of mediated negotiations?
Social scientists have conducted a wide variety of studies of negotiation
dynamics and of the psychology of negotiators. One of the goals of this essay is
to describe findings from some of this research that could help inform a
mediator's coaching suggestions, findings that a mediator could discuss with
other participants in a mediation to enhance the level of their engagement in the
process and to sophisticate everyone's thinking about the possible effects of
specific approaches, behaviors, or kinds of "moves" that might be made during
a mediation. The purpose of this foray into social science is neither to critique
nor validate specific studies, but to elaborate and enrich the way mediators and
lawyers think about negotiation dynamics and to offer them some new ways to
conceptualize both their mission and the ways they might contribute.
United States Magistrate Judge (Ret.); mediator and arbitrator with JAMS, Inc.;
Professor from Practice, Berkeley Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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A mediator who has occasion during a session to mention insights from
social science would be well advised to make it clear that the point of
pointing to any particular findings is not to direct the parties' course of action
along formulaic lines, but only to expand the multiple considerations that
litigants might take into account when making their decisions about how to
proceed.
A few prefatory clarifications are in order before diving into substance.
First, this essay addresses mediations that occur in a specific setting: in civil
cases (1) in which all parties are represented by counsel and (2) that have
survived (or appear likely to survive) challenges by motions, including
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, i.e., cases that apparently will
not need to surmount any significant additional legal or procedural barriers to
get to trial.
Second, it is important to point out that while some of the coaching ideas
I describe could be discussed during joint sessions, others would be
appropriately presented only in private caucus with one side or one group of
similarly aligned parties. Coaching during private caucuses can create risks
to role and ethics that would not arise, or would be much less intense, in joint
sessions. On the other hand, in some circumstances it might be only during
private caucuses that a mediator would be able to make some significant
coaching-based contributions to the viability of negotiations. My goal, of
course, is neither to defend nor condemn private caucusing in mediations of
civil cases. In this essay, I simply accept the fact. that, at least in many urban
areas, private caucusing has become a standard component of mediations in a
wide range of civil cases.
The third set of necessary prefatory acknowledgments relate to the social
science piece of this essay. Some of the research findings that I will discuss
might seem obvious, or equally accessible through intuition. Neither fact,
even if true, would make the results of this research useless to mediators. The
findings reported here can offer mediators validating external support for
behaviors that many mediators, as a matter of personal philosophy, want to
encourage. Stated differently, products of social science research can bolster
mediators' confidence that they can contribute to the parties' prospects of
achieving their ends by encouraging them to follow constructive paths and to
proceed with integrity. Moreover, parties might listen a little more openly to
a mediator's process suggestions when the mediator can say, in effect: "The
specific process suggestion I am asking you to consider is not really my idea.
It is the product of several sophisticated studies that strongly suggest that if
you take this approach [or make this move], it is likely to have the effect that
you would like." While the occasions to explicitly invoke findings from
social science research will not be numerous, I believe that judicious, well-
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timed use of information of this kind could enhance the value that a mediator
adds to a negotiation.
It also is important to note that much of the social science research
reported in this essay has been conducted in settings that offer opportunities
for "integrative" bargaining,' i.e., settings in which there are multiple
possible elements or components of a deal and that present parties with
opportunities to make trades based on the fact that they might ascribe
different valuations to different elements of a deal package. While this fact
should make us careful about generalizing from the findings of some of the
studies, it is by no means a sufficient ground for ignoring all of the work that
has been done in this arena. For one thing, even mediations in lawsuits that
are about to go to trial may present more opportunities for integrative
bargaining than lawyers and clients might assume. It can be a serious mistake
to conclude that negotiations in these settings can be nothing more than
exercises in distributive bargaining. Trades in subtle commodities like
feelings, time, positions, reputations, or opportunities may be possible much
more often than is commonly recognized.
Moreover, while it would not be wise to assume that findings about
optimal outcomes can be transported safely from studies of bargaining that
takes place in settings with integrative potential to settings in which only
distributive bargaining is possible, it would be unwise to assume that we
cannot transport from integrative to distributive settings, at least as working
hypotheses, some of the insights that social science research has developed
about how certain kinds of behaviors by negotiators are likely to affect
negotiation behavior by other participants in the process. In other words, we
need to be less worried about transporting findings about outcomes than
findings about particular process dynamics.
2. Exploring the Notions of "Coaching" and "Reciprocal Coaching"
A thesis of this essay is that in some circumstances a mediator might
well be able to help the parties improve the quality and productivity of their
mediation by offering "coaching" suggestions and by encouraging all
participants in the mediation, lawyers and litigants, to expand their vision of
their role from mere player to player/coach. In this vision of things, the
mediator is by no means the only source of coaching input or ideas. While it
is expected that every player/coach will coach his own team and try to
I
See Roy J. LEwICKI, BRUCE BARRY & DAVID M. SUNDERS, NEGOTIATION 71-75
(McGraw Hill, 6th and Int'l ed. 2010).
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advance his own team's interests, each player/coach also is asked, explicitly,
to do some coaching that could reach participants that are not on his team (in
the immediate sense)' and that promotes a broader objective: maximizing the
health and productivity of the mediation process as a whole. That end cannot
be achieved by a vision of coaching that is limited to one team and to one's
own teammates. Instead, each participant is asked to include in his vision of
his role an understanding of the mediation as an organic whole, as an
organism whose vitality can be either enhanced or threatened by every
participant.
What do I have in mind when I use the term "coaching" in this context?
Certainly not directing parties or lawyers to proceed in a specified manner or
to follow a script written by the mediator.3 We are not talking about coaching
A la Woody Hayes or Bobby Knight - or even John Wooden.4 Rather, the
coaching that I contemplate is rooted in attentive thinking about the quality
of the game as it progresses and consists principally of (1) generating ideas
about how to improve the quality of the game as a whole (as opposed to how
to improve one side's chances of "winning"), (2) asking other participants to
generate process ideas with that same shared goal, and (3) encouraging
everyone to participate, actively, in assessing the pros and cons of the
process ideas that are suggested, regardless of their source. It is "process"-
not content or substance-that is the principal target or subject of the
coaching I have in mind.! Coaching by a mediator directly about "content" or
2
One important concept that the mediator tries to encourage all participants to
understand is that in a significant sense every participant is a member of the same team -
a team that shares one objective: to identify as reliably as possible what is possible
through mediation. I explore this idea in a subsequent section.
3
As will be discussed in a subsequent section, a mediator can reduce the risk of her
"coaching" degenerating into "directing" by encouraging all participants to offer coaching
suggestions and by involving all participants in active assessment of every process idea
that surfaces, perhaps especially those presented in the first instance by the mediator.
4
The sports metaphor is potentially misleading and dangerous. As will be clear, I
believe that mediators should not encourage parties to view a mediation as a game or as a
contest, especially a game or contest out of which one party will emerge as the winner
and the other as the loser. Keeping "score" is fundamentally inconsistent with the most
productive approaches to mediation, as is a "competitive" approach generally.
5
It is important to acknowledge that sometimes the line between "process" and
"substance" can be thin and difficult to locate. Moreover, as will become clear in some of
the discussions of specific coaching challenges, infra, coaching whose immediate or
direct target is process can have implications for or be rooted in concerns or thoughts
about substance. So the distinction is in some measure artificial and in some settings
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"substance" could raise different and sometimes more challenging issues
about role and ethics.
A good mediator understands that the vehicles for coaching are both
explicit and implicit. She appreciates that she is coaching not only when she
is asking questions or presenting process ideas or helping assess process
alternatives, but also every time she interacts with anyone in the mediation or
responds to any of the actions or words of others. She understands that she
coaches by example: by how she treats others and their ideas and
circumstances, by the respect she shows everyone, by how she listens and
engages, and by how hard she tries, visibly and genuinely, to understand-
circumstances, emotions, challenges, ideas, lines of argument, positions.
Importantly, she coaches by the way she expresses her views, by how she
qualifies, conditions and contextualizes what she says. She teaches the
ubiquity and magnitude of uncertainty, the roles of unmeasurable (and
sometimes unforeseeable) variables, by the way she helps parties identify and
work through each component of multi-element analyses.
For purposes of clarity, it also is wise to distinguish coaching from
"cheerleading." It would be unwise, however, to dismiss or categorically
denigrate the latter-at least when it is not naively exuberant. As Steve
Goldberg's and Margaret Shaw's survey data suggest,7 the mediators whose
breaks down. By trying to maintain our principal focus on process, however, we reduce
the risk of over-intrusive interventions and encourage all participants in the mediation to
attend to dynamics from a perspective that increases the likelihood that they will consider
the circumstances of other players and think about how their behaviors are likely to affect
others.
6
Targets of coaching about "content" or "substance" might include, for example,
analysis of claims or defenses, assessments of lines of reasoning or argument, identifying
investigative paths to pursue, projections about likely reactions by triers of fact to specific
documents or testimony or witnesses, or predictions about likelihoods of rulings on
motions or outcomes at trial.
It is not uncommon for lawyers and litigants to ask a mediator to express his or her
views about the merits of a case, or to provide assessments (in the mediator's eyes) of the
strengths and weaknesses of parties' positions. I do not mean to suggest that responding
to such requests by providing what amounts to a second opinion is unethical or
inappropriate. In fact, as I discuss, infra, at 37-39, mediators may be able to meet real
and significant party needs by providing "second opinions" in some circumstances,
provided they do so in carefully explained and cabined ways. Such substantive feedback
from a mediator, however, falls outside the domain of the type of "process coaching" that
I have in mind at most junctures in this essay.
7
Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of Successful (and
Unsuccessful) Mediators Continued: Studies Two and Three, 23 NEGOT. J. 393 (2007).
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help is likely to be most valued by lawyers and litigants share characteristics
with good cheerleaders. Highly regarded mediators demonstrate, by the level
of energy they bring to their work and by their active engagement with the
parties and the process, that they understand and empathize with the
challenges the parties face and really want to help them move forward.! Good
mediators also understand, intuitively, elemental propositions that are
supported by social science: that people, generally, are likely to be
responsive to positive reinforcement and often can be motivated by praise.'
Good mediation cheerleading should include projecting some optimism
(appropriately moderated to fit the participants and their circumstances)
about prospects for reaching an agreement. Mediators should cheerlead in
this way not only at the beginning of a mediation, but periodically over the
course of a session. And to help litigants and their lawyers sustain the level
of energetic engagement that will benefit them the most, mediators should
explicitly summarize, at several junctures, the progress the parties have made
and how it augurs well for the ultimate success of the negotiations.
Before proceeding to consider ideas about how to frame (for parties and
ourselves) the objectives of a mediation and how to introduce explicitly the
concept of coaching to participants in a mediation, it is important to
acknowledge that there are no universally accepted sets of criteria by which
the health, the value, or the productivity of mediations should be determined.
Given this fact, it is reasonably arguable that the first responsibility of a
mediator in any given case should be to try to learn from the parties what
criteria they want to use to measure the quality or to assess the level of
success of their mediation.
Getting parties to think with any level of sophistication about how to
measure the health of a mediation process is likely to be a challenge. More
than occasionally all parties will share the view, at least until pressed to think
a little harder about it, that there is only one criterion for assessing the
productivity of a mediation: whether it generated a settlement. Parties who
pay mediators substantial sums sometimes say that what they are paying for
8
Id See also Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman, Bringing Peace into the Room: The
Personal Qualities of the Mediator and Their Impact on the Mediation, in BRINGING
PEACE INTO THE RooM 13 (Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003).
9
See, e.g., Manuel London et al., Relationships Between Feedback and Self-
Development, 24 GRP. AND ORG. MGMT. 5 (1999). See also Roger Volkema & Cheryl
Rivers, Beyond Frogs and Scorpions: A Risk-Based Framework for Understanding
Negotiating Counterparts'Ethical Motivations, 28 NEGOT. J. 379, 388-89 (2012).
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is to get the case settled.'o Period. Moreover, some such parties will say that
the end (getting a settlement) is so important to them that they don't care
what means are used to achieve that end. They might well say that they could
not care less about the "health" or "quality" of the process. Some will even
say that, if it would get a deal done, they would readily accept a process that
featured overt and aggressive pressure from the mediator, and/or
manipulation or deception by her (though holders of such views are likely to
assume that the target of the pressure or manipulation or deception will be
someone else-their opponent or, sometimes, their own client).
What are we to do with such views? The first order of business should be
to determine whether the parties to a given mediation actually hold beliefs
like these. The time to make this determination is before the date set for the
mediation session.
In a pre-mediation phone conference with counsel, the mediator could
ask if there is any particular approach the lawyers believe would be most
appropriate to their clients' circumstances. Unless counsel respond with a
very specific prescription, the mediator should describe, briefly, the approach
she normally would take and the ways she would try to add value and
provide help. She also might identify one or two things she will not do, e.g.,
try to manipulate parties emotionally (for example, by yelling at them) or to
coerce them into accepting a deal. The mediator also could invite each
lawyer to speak ex parte with her before the date set for the session, e.g., if
they would like to share some information privately with her or if they want
to discuss in greater depth how she will try to work toward settlement.
Pre-session contacts like these are likely to provide the mediator with
some sense of the roles the lawyers anticipate her playing and of whether
counsel might have misplaced expectations about the range of techniques she
would be prepared to employ.
It is important to emphasize, however, that a mediator who senses that
the parties really do elevate the end of reaching a settlement over any
concern about how that goal is achieved is under no duty to play the role of
bully or trickster just because that is what the parties are prepared to
tolerate-unless the mediator has clearly agreed in advance to follow a script
so written. In the private sector, if parties can agree on the methods they want
used during a mediation for which they pay, they may feel that they have a
right to insist that those means be used. They might believe that their right to
10
The author has had numerous conversations with his colleagues at JAMS, Inc.,
who report that this view is widely held among lawyers in commercial cases.
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choose the means their mediator would employ is an expression or dimension
of their right to self-determination.
It does not follow, however, that a mediator has any obligation to accept
an engagement in which she would be expected to use means that are not
consistent with her sense of professionalism or with the mandates of
applicable law. And there are applicable legal mandates, at least in
California. For example, a mediator who has been selected or appointed by a
California court, or who will be compensated for her service by the court,
must comply with California Rule of Court 3.853, which compels mediators
to "conduct the mediation in a manner that supports the principles of
voluntary participation and self-determination by the parties." The Advisory
Committee's Comment to this Rule identifies, as "examples of conduct that
violate the principles of voluntary participation and self-determination,"
either "providing an opinion or evaluation of the dispute in a coercive
manner or over the objection of the parties [or] using abusive language . . . "
It is at least arguable that yelling at a litigant or lawyer during a mediation
would constitute "using abusive language." Similarly, delivering an opinion
about the merits of a party's position in anger (real or feigned), or with
unbridled emotional vehemence, might well be deemed "providing an
opinion or evaluation of the dispute in a coercive manner. . ." Thus, at least
in some settings, public policy can provide support for mediators to resist
pressure from counsel or parties to use emotionally or analytically aggressive
tactics to pursue a settlement.
There is a broader reality, however, that is much more important to bear
in mind. Given the very wide range of circumstances in which mediations
take place, and the equally wide range of values and personalities that parties
bring to mediations, it is likely that only a small percentage of consumers of
mediation services (even big corporate parties in high stakes cases) would so
decisively subjugate means to ends that they would endorse a mediator's use
of crude emotional manipulation or outright deception in order to get a deal.
In fact, it is quite likely that the vast majority of parties have strong feelings
about how they should be treated during a mediation-and would be
profoundly alienated by the disrespect for them that would accompany
bullying, lying, or emotional manipulation by a mediator.
Nonetheless, we need to acknowledge that lawyers (and, to a lesser
extent, litigants) enter the mediation experience with a wide range of often
unexamined assumptions about mediation's purposes and about the means
that should or likely will be used to pursue those purposes. Given this fact of
life, it behooves us to be prepared to debate (with evidence not only from our
experience, but also from social science) two of the premises that inform the
views of those who would have us pursue settlement at all costs and by any
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means imaginable, regardless of the ethical or emotional implications.
The first of these challengeable premises is that the mediation can deliver
value commensurate with its cost only if it produces a settlement.
Mediations that "fail" to yield settlements can deliver great value.
Mediations yield learning (about an opponent and her case, as well as about
one's own client and case). That learning, some of which could be acquired in
no other way, can equip lawyers to sophisticate their preparation for and
execution of pretrial and trial strategy. As important, a failed mediation can
expose clearly what the best alternative to going to trial really is-thus
providing the firmest possible basis for decisions about whether to proceed
with the litigation. At the end of a failed mediation whose potential has been
exhausted, a party can say to himself (with much greater justification and
conviction than would otherwise be possible): "I now know what my
alternative to going to trial would in fact be, and, with that knowledge, I now
see why it is necessary for me to go to trial." That sense of certainty is of
great value-very often more than enough to justify the cost even of a "high
end" mediator's fee.
The second premise that we should be prepared to debate is that there is
no relation between means and ends-that the quality or character of the
mediation process has no bearing on the likelihood that a settlement will be
reached. There probably are some cases that could be settled only by resort to
crude forms of pressure, emotional manipulation, or some kind of deception.
But there are a great many circumstances in which the perceived quality and
character of a negotiation can affect the potential value a mediation can
deliver.
At least when circumstances present an opportunity for some integrative
bargaining, there tends to be a correlation between certain aspects of the
quality of the negotiation process (how much information is shared, how
much trust is generated, how reciprocal the concession making seems, etc.)
and the likelihood that the negotiations will yield an agreement, or the
likelihood that the terms of the agreement reached will be at least in the
vicinity of optimal.
II
See, e.g., John K. Butler, Jr., Trust Expectations, Information Sharing, Climate of
Trust, and Negotiation Effectiveness and Efficiency, 24 GRP. AND ORG. MGMT. 217, 217-
38 (1999); Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Biana Beersma, Katherine Stroebe & Martin C.
Euwema, Motivated Information Processing, Strategic Choice, and the Quality of
Negotiated Agreement, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 927, 927-43 (2006);
Catherine H. Tinsley, Kathleen M. O'Connor & Brandon A. Sullivan, Tough Guys Finish
Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORG'L BEHAV. AND HuM. DECISION
PROCESSES 621, 621-42 (2002).
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One of the principal purposes of this essay is to help mediators identify
some of the research that supports this important connection between quality
of process and quality of negotiated outcome.
Having said all this, we must acknowledge, squarely, where the power
rests to decide whether we engage in coaching. Regardless of what we
believe about how some kinds of coaching might advance the parties'
interests, it is the parties, not the mediator, who get to decide whether their
mediation should include any coaching and, if so, what kind. While we are
under no duty to adopt approaches that compromise our values, we have no
authority to impose our values on parties who do not share them or to use
methods to which parties object. So, instead of simply ploughing forward, we
should use conversations about coaching, before and during a mediation, to
demonstrate the importance of dialogue about and shared responsibility for
how the mediation will proceed.
III. CONTEXT
A. Risk of "Error"
Why should mediators or other participants in negotiations even consider
engaging in coaching? Are there problems that reciprocal coaching might
help address? If so, are there ways that mediators could expose the
magnitude and frame the character of such problems that might encourage
lawyers and litigants to be more open to coaching and to participating in the
coaching enterprise?
One of the most fundamental kinds of contributions mediators can make
to the level of wisdom that informs negotiations in cases that have survived
motions for summary judgment is to help participants understand how
thoroughly uncertainty pervades their circumstance. Uncertainty and
unpredictability are the dominating facts of litigation life in cases whose
resolution turns not on the law, but on how a jury or judge responds to
competing evidentiary presentations. A civil trial, especially to a jury, is a sui
generis, stand-alone, one time historical factum. It cannot be replicated or
repeated. It is not subject to anything remotely akin to scientific analysis or
predictive assessment. It is healthy for lawyers and litigants to be disabused
(gently) of notions to the contrary.
Early in the life of a mediation, mediators might briefly describe the
results of an illuminating study that compared outcomes at trial to earlier
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(rejected) offers of judgment in more than 2,000 civil cases in California and
in many hundreds of such matters in New York.12 In 86% of these cases, a
party "erred" in rejecting the offer of judgment, meaning that the outcome at
trial left the party worse off than the party would have been if it had accepted
the offer of judgment. While the incidence of this kind of error was much
higher among plaintiffs than among defendants (61% compared to 24%), the
cost of error was much greater for defendants than for plaintiffs ($1,140,000
to $43,100).
Interestingly, error rates were quite different for both plaintiffs and
defendants when the case was tried to a judge than when it was tried to a
jury. But the direction of change is counter-intuitive: defendants error rate
increased dramatically (from 24% to 43%) in court trials, while the error rate
for plaintiffs' decreased by a comparable margin (from 61% to 43%). It
seems that defendants (or their lawyers) are more prone than plaintiffs (or
their lawyers) to misplace confidence in their ability to foresee how judges
will resolve contested factual issues.
There is one additional set of findings from this study that mediators
might find especially useful in coaching. When the social scientists searched
for variables that might affect error rates, they discovered that the factor that
had the greatest impact, by far, was the making of an offer of judgment.
When only the plaintiff made an offer of judgment, the error rate by
plaintiffs dropped significantly, from 61% to 41%-while the error rate by
defendants in these circumstances increased substantially, from 22% to 46%.
The pattern of change in error rates was just the opposite when only the
defendant made an offer of judgment: in this circumstance, defendants' error
rate dropped dramatically (from 22% to a mere 7%), while plaintiffs' error
rate rose from 61% to a truly intimidating 83%."
The hypothesis the study's authors suggested to try to explain these
significant patterns is that the process of thinking through what offer of
judgment to make might have required lawyers and their clients to engage in
a more thorough assessment of the pertinent evidence and to make more
careful assessments of value and risk than they would make when they did
not prepare an offer ofjudgment, but, instead, merely reacted to such an offer
from an opponent. In appropriate circumstances (e.g., perhaps after
negotiations seem to have hit a temporary stall), mediators might consider
12
Randall Kiser et al., Let's Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision
Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551,
551-91 (2008).
13
Id. at 572-76.
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using this data (and the authors' explanatory hypothesis) to encourage both
parties to go through the process of working up and exchanging offers of
judgment.
There is an additional study whose results mediators might consider
sharing with lawyers and litigants, early in the life of a mediation, to help
foster an appropriate understanding of the mutually reinforcing roles of
uncertainty and over-confidence in decision-making about settling civil
cases. Entitled "Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes," 4 the research discussed in this article by Jane Goodman-
Delahunty and her colleagues supports the following propositions:
(1) Over-confidence is ubiquitous in our population generally, (2) over-
confidence increases with the difficulty [complexity] of the task, (3) because
trying to predict the outcome of something as multi-faceted as a trial is quite
difficult, there is a significant risk that lawyers will make over-confidence
based errors in such undertakings, and (4) "[l]awyers frequently make
substantial judgmental errors, showing a proclivity to over-optimism." When
they compared the outcomes of cases to lawyers' minimum goals for those
cases, Ms. Goodman-Delahunty and her colleagues found that lawyers'
expectations were off the mark about two-thirds of the time, but that far more
lawyers displayed the over-confidence bias (44%) than displayed the under-
confidence bias (24%).
When the authors of this study offered possible explanations for the
considerable risk of error rooted in overconfidence by lawyers trying to
foresee case outcomes they suggested, in addition to the complexity of the
task, the following: (1) lawyers' absorption of their duty to advocate
zealously, (2) their desire to attract clients and to encourage their clients to
feel that they were being represented vigorously and effectively, (3) counsels'
need to justify how much money they were charging their clients, a need that
would grow over time as bills to clients mount, and (4) the lawyers' belief or
assumption that they had the capacity to take steps during the litigation that
would increase the likelihood that they would secure a positive outcome for
their client. The last of these possible factors also might be characterized as a
lawyer's illusion that he could exercise some meaningful control over how
the litigation would play out.
How great a role any of these possible factors might play is less
14
Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y. & L. 133, 133-57 (2010). See also Margaret
A. Neal & Max H. Bazerman, The Effects ofFraming and Negotiator Overconfidence on
Bargaining Behavior and Outcomes, 28 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 34, 34-49 (1985).
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important than the foundational facts about the prevalence of the over-
confidence bias and the incidence of error in predicting litigation outcomes.
It is these foundational facts that mediators might use to best effect when
trying to coach lawyers and clients toward wise appreciations of uncertainty
and risk.
B. Framing the Principal Purposes of a Mediation to Identify as
Reliably as Possible What Is Possible and to Avoid False Failure
For good and understandable reasons, lawyers and litigants who are
engaged in settlement negotiations of a case that has survived challenges by
motions are very interested in trying to develop at least some predictive
leverage on what might happen, or what might be likely to happen, if the
case is tried to judgment. This is certainly an important analytical arena that
parties and mediators may be able to mine productively, in some cases, as
they search for reasons or rationales for making adjustments in their
expectations and in their settlement positions. But because there is
considerable risk of error in predicting trial outcomes, and because
reasonable and well-informed minds often can find a multitude of bases for
disagreeing about how a case might play out at trial, it is not clear that it
serves clients' interests best to permit a mediation to revolve entirely around,
or even to focus primarily on, sustained substantive analyses of liability and
damages. The merits are important, to be sure, and can be important sources
of movement leverage, but it may be a mistake for mediators to suggest, or
for lawyers and litigants to assume, that the primary purpose of a mediation
is to develop the most reliable possible prognosis of outcome at trial. 5 As it
15
There is indirect support for the notion that lawyers understand how difficult it is
to predict with confidence how a trial will play out in data about the direction of change
in patterns of user preferences among the four ADR process options offered to litigants in
the Multi-Option Program of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Users have given all four of the Court-sponsored ADR processes very high
marks (in responses to questionnaires) for overall quality. Despite this fact, and despite
the fact that two of these four processes (non-binding arbitration and early neutral
evaluation) are designed to provide parties with the most informational leverage for
predicting outcome at trial, over the past decade or so users have shown a decided and
growing preference for the two forms of ADR (mediation and settlement conferences
hosted by magistrate judges) that (1) feature less direct and less systematic presentation
and analysis of law and evidence and that (2) focus less on trying to improve parties'
ability to predict outcome at trial. User assessments of the four ADR processes and
patterns in user preferences among them are discussed in some detail in Wayne D. Brazil,
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turns out, the most reliable possible prognosis might not be very reliable.
And even if such a prognosis might be relatively sound in a particular case,
focusing obsessively on it might cause participants in mediations to miss
opportunities to find terms on which they could settle.
Are there alternative ways to frame [no need to underline] or articulate
the principal objectives of a mediation that might, if embraced by the parties,
better serve the interests that brought them to the mediation table? To present
one such alternative, I set forth here a portion of the opening statement I
often make in mediations I host. Three principal purposes inform this
statement: (1) to encourage parties to think a little differently than they
otherwise might about what the principal objective of the mediation should
be (and thus to signal that the negotiations will embrace considerably more
than analytical/argumentative sparring about the most likely outcome at
trial), (2) to encourage all participants to feel some sense of responsibility for
the health of the mediation process itself (as opposed to ownership only of its
outcome), and (3) to discourage some of the common negotiation behaviors
that could compromise the group's collective ability to maximize the value
that the mediation can deliver.
Opening Statement [in part]
"d like to suggest what I think is a useful way to conceptualize
the goal of this mediation. Our primary goal is not to settle your
case. Instead, our primary goal is to identify as reliably as possible
what is possible through this process. What we want to do is to
identify the best terms that are accessible through negotiation. It is
only if we succeed in accurately identifying those terms that we will
position each of you to compare rationally your alternative paths
forward: agreeing to a settlement or proceeding to trial. Once we
have identified what is possible through mediation, it will be up to
each of you to decide, independently, whether to end this case by
mutual agreement or to proceed with the litigation.
To maximize the odds that we will achieve our goal it is
essential that everyone who is participating today share
responsibility for the productivity of our process.
Informalism and Formalism in the History of ADR in the United States and an
Exploration of the Sources, Character, and Implications of Formalism in a Court-
Sponsored ADR Program, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ALTERNATIVES TO FORMALIZATION
(Joachim Zekoll, Moritz Balz & Iwo Emelung eds.) (forthcoming 2014).
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As we move through the day, each ofyou will be thinking about
your positions, your interests, the relevant law and evidence-but
we also need you to be thinking about the process itself At each
juncture, what would be healthiest for the process? What seem to
be the principal barriers to getting a deal-and how might we best
work to overcome those barriers? Are there ways we could proceed
that would increase our chances of success? Should we change
formats? Should the parties meet without their lawyers? Should
only the experts meet with the mediator? Should we shift our
attention to a different subject or to a different possible component
of a deal? How is the other party likely to react to or interpret a
contemplated proposal or move? Are there additional people we
should involve, or is there additional information we should share,
or for which we should ask?
In sum, we need to keep asking ourselves how we should shape
or adjust our process so as to improve the likelihood that we will
learn, as accurately as possible, what is possible. We have a much
better chance of succeeding in this if all of our minds are thinking
about these things than if it is only my mind that focuses on what is
best for the process.
We will have a better mediation if we think of mediation as a
team sport. But it is a team sport with an unusual feature. Every
participant is simultaneously a player and a coach. One of my jobs
is to offer coaching suggestions as we move through the day; for
example, I might make observations, based on my experience,
about how the other parties are likely to understand or respond to
some move or idea that is being considered. I would like all of you
to play the same role. Coach me; suggest ways I might play the
most constructive role. If you have an idea about how we might
best proceed, tell me about it and we can consider it together. If it
would make you more comfortable, pull me aside so we can think
about your idea privately before we plunge ahead.
Several years ago it occurred to me that one way to understand
a primary objective of my coaching during mediations is to help
reduce the risk of 'false failure." False failure occurs when, in
theory, there are terms "somewhere out there" on which the parties
could agree, but we fail to find those terms because we make some
unnecessary, avoidable process mistake.
The kinds of mistakes I'm talking about include:
* posturing too much or for too long,
* playing informational cards too close to the vest,
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* interpersonal or psychological errors (for example, saying
something that needlessly offends another party or taking
positions that leave other participants too little room to achieve
something),
* failing to see that shifting to some other format, or having
principals or experts talk directly to one another, would create
new opportunities or would better meet certain needs,
* sending misleading signals or misreading signals that others
send, or
* falling victim to a common cognitive trap like reactive
devaluation or confirmation bias.
As we proceed through the mediation today, let's keep these
potential sources offalsefailure in mind. Each of us should be on
the lookout for them; each of us should help us avoid them. In other
words, let's coach one another about how to handle the process
most productively."
IV. WHY FRAME THE OBJECTIVE As IDENTIFYING
As RELIABLY As POSSIBLE WHAT IS POSSIBLE?
While one of the purposes of including these thoughts in an opening
statement is to encourage all of the participants in a mediation to view
themselves not only as players, but also as coaches, another is to urge
lawyers and litigants alike to understand that they all share one overriding
objective: to determine, accurately, what terms are accessible through
mediation or settlement negotiations. All the participants, in other words, are
coaching toward a common goal. Why might it be helpful to encourage
parties to acknowledge that they have a common goal? Studies by social
scientists support the following proposition: Negotiators are less likely to
resort to ethically dubious and often counter-productive negotiating tactics if
they believe that they share short term goals with their counterparts, or that
the likelihood of success in a short term task is interdependent, or that in
some other significant sense their fates seem intertwined.
Thus, the more the parties buy into the notion that at least in one
important sense their objective is the same, the greater the likelihood that
they will go about the process of negotiating in ways that maximize a
16
See studies and experimental research cited by Volkema & Rivers, supra note 9, at
389.
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mediation's potential productivity.
A. Early and Repeated Coaching About Coaching
While the section of the opening statement presented above includes
explicit encouragement of reciprocal coaching, mediators would be well
advised not to wait until the session is convened to introduce litigants and
lawyers to these kinds of ideas. To improve the likelihood that participants
will understand that they have a significant role to play in coaching
dynamics, and to give them an opportunity in advance to think about
coaching ideas they might suggest, mediators should introduce this topic in
pre-mediation conferences with counsel and in any material they provide the
parties before the date set for the mediation.
In his pre-mediation contact with counsel, the mediator should make a
specific point of encouraging each lawyer not only to make process
suggestions, but also to pull the mediator aside at any point during the
proceedings if the lawyer has ideas about how the mediator might more
constructively interact with his or her client.
I have received some extremely helpful suggestions from counsel in this
way. Sometimes, unbeknownst to me, the way I am handling my role is
confusing or even alienating a litigant. I do my job better when a lawyer pulls
me aside to explain the situation. Lawyers often are well positioned to
provide us with feedback or suggestions about how we might adjust our
approach to make their client feel more comfortable with and more
confidence in the process. Lawyers sometimes can point us to subjects or
circumstances on which we might more productively focus, or can make very
useful suggestions about steps we might take to connect better with or to
clarify something for their client. Our mediations are likely to be better if we
explicitly encourage lawyers, both before and during the sessions, to share
thoughts along any of these lines with us.
Encouragement in the abstract might well not be sufficient. In addition,
we should create opportunities at various junctures during a session for each
lawyer to speak privately with us. In these settings we should ask counsel
directly (and separately) if they have any suggestions about the process or
about how we might most appropriately and constructively interact with any
of the other participants.
It can be important to create such opportunities relatively early in a
session, before the mediation has progressed so far that adjustments in our
approach would no longer be effective. By pulling counsel aside relatively
early to ask for input of this kind, we can make our appeal for reciprocal
coaching more real and encourage lawyers to feel more engaged and invested
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in the process. As we get deeper into the session, we should continue to be on
the alert for situations in which additional private conversations with counsel
might be helpful. It can be especially important to create occasions for this
kind of private communication at junctures where the risk of impasse seems
to be growing.
B. Some of the Potential Benefits of Coaching Toward Reciprocal
Coaching
Working to convert other participants in a mediation from mere players
into player/coaches can yield multiple benefits. While it is important to be
realistic about such matters, and to acknowledge that the magnitude of the
benefits I will describe lends itself to exaggeration, any contributions in the
directions outlined in this section could deliver value to litigants and lawyers.
Discussing process ideas with lawyers and their clients provides
mediators with opportunities to teach about negotiation dynamics and about
the importance of maximizing the health of a mediation as a whole, to model
careful thinking about the implications of various behaviors or steps that
negotiators might consider taking, and to encourage parties to follow courses
of action that are both ethically more attractive and, at least as suggested by
social science, more likely to enhance the productivity of the mediation
process. The act of engaging in this kind of discussion can open participant's
minds and lead them to share more information with the mediator, perhaps
opening doors to sharing more information across party lines.
Discussing process ideas with counsel and their clients also can affect the
tone and focus of a negotiation. Generating and trying to assess the potential
effects of process ideas are exercises in thinking, in reasoning: trying to
identify pertinent circumstances and variables (legal and non-legal), and
trying to understand or predict analytical, emotional, and psychological
causes and effects. Because these undertakings are fundamentally exercises
in reasoning, the more litigants and their lawyers engage in them, the more
reasoning takes center stage in the process. The greater the role of reasoning,
the less room and the fewer occasions there will be for participants to resort
to crude theatrics or efforts at emotional manipulation. The greater the focus
on reasoning, the less hospitable the environment will seem to gaming or
slights of negotiation hands.
This is not to suggest that the value that should dominate all mediations
is rationality. In some mediations a principal objective is to help parties
recognize the emotional and psychological dimensions of a conflict and to
provide them with vehicles for experiencing or processing feelings. There is
no necessary tension, however, between such objectives and reasoning.
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Reasoning can be an important tool for trying to understand emotions and for
trying to identify the most effective ways to address psychological needs.
Thinking creatively about such matters is a form of reasoning that can deliver
great value to parties. Reasoning, in other words, can be an ally of emotion
rather than its antagonist.
Discussing the pros and cons of various process ideas with lawyers and
their clients also can provide a mediator with a unique opportunity to learn
(perhaps a great deal) about the individual participants in the session and
about how each of them is going about negotiating. A discussion of process
options can reveal concerns, fears, motives, assumptions, objectives, or
values that are in play (perhaps at a subterranean level) in the negotiation
dynamic. More specifically, the way a participant responds to process ideas
could shed light on how ready to share or inclined to hide information she
might be, the level of confidence or apprehension she brings to the process,
whether she assumes the bargaining will be fundamentally competitive and
distributive or seems open to a more integrative approach. Similarly, the
process ideas that a participant proposes, or the way he thinks about process
options, could expose how tactical he is inclined to be-and what ideas or
assumptions about negotiating and about the other participants in the process
inform his tactical thinking. The more such information a mediator acquires,
the better positioned she will be to help correct inaccurate assumptions and to
help the parties avoid counterproductive acts.
Engaging parties in active assessments of the pros and cons of various
process options, or in trying to project the various ways an opponent might
react to or interpret different possible proposals or moves, also can reduce the
risk that parties will thoughtlessly send misleading signals to other
participants or will inadvertently invite an opponent to draw erroneous
inferences about a party's intentions or motives. It can be important to the
health and sustainability of a negotiation to encourage or preserve a
perception that bargaining is being conducted in "good faith," and parties are
less likely to take a step that inadvertently triggers cynicism and a perception
of "bad faith" if, before deciding on a particular course of action, they join
with their mediator in actively evaluating the possible effects of their process
options."
17
It is useful to recognize that sometimes lawyers or litigants will invoke, with
apparent but essentially insincere outrage, the notions of "good faith" or "bad faith" for
tactical purposes, e.g., to justify refusing to make any significant change in a bargaining
position, or to try to use artificial moral leverage to pressure an opponent to make a more
generous offer or demand, or to try to influence the perceptions and actions of the
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Converting participants into process coaches, involving them actively in
generating and assessing process ideas, also can improve mediation
dynamics by expanding the scope of participants' vision-extending the
reach of their interest and concern beyond themselves to the mediation as an
organic whole. To coach toward the goal of making the process as healthy
and productive as possible it is necessary to think about the process
holistically. A participant who looks at a mediation holistically is more likely
than someone with a narrower focus to understand more clearly and to take
more seriously the other participants' circumstances and perspectives.
As implied in the preceding paragraphs, the more participants in a
mediation buy into the role of player/coach, the more invested in and
responsible for the quality and productivity of the process they will likely
feel. Enter social science.
Social science research offers substantial support for the proposition that
elevating participants' sense of responsibility for the character and outcome
of a negotiation can improve the dynamic between parties and increase the
likelihood that they will be able to identify terms that deliver good value.
While the relevant studies generally have involved situations with potential
for integrative bargaining and solutions, the insights the studies have
generated about negotiation behaviors seem worthy of close attention (and
use) in a broad set of circumstances. For present purposes, the most
illuminating single paper in this arena was published by Carsten De Dreu and
his colleagues in 2006." Building on earlier research and reporting new
findings, this paper explores the effects of "process accountability" and
"epistemic motivation" on the way people think and behave during
negotiations. The phrase process accountability refers to the level of
responsibility that negotiators feel for how a negotiation proceeds and plays
out. The concept of epistemic motivation captures a negotiator's level of
interest in or motivation to understand both (1) the causes or sources of the
way each individual participant in a mediation feels and acts (including the
interests or goals each negotiator pursues and the positions he or she takes)
and (2) why the dynamic between the negotiating parties takes on the
character and yields the outcomes that it does.'9 As discussed by Dr. De Dreu
and his colleagues, these two concepts are in some measure related or
overlap, at least in the sense that variations in their levels tend to have more
mediator.
18
De Dreu et al., supra note 11.
Id. at 928-29.
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or less parallel effects.20
The research reported by Dr. De Dreu suggests that a host of positive
effects are likely to result when negotiators feel higher levels of either
process accountability or epistemic motivation, at least when the negotiators
have some interest in how terms of a deal might affect others. Thus, elevated
process accountability or epistemic motivation tends to increase a
negotiator's readiness to accept new information and to cause her to process
new information more carefully and systematically. As she is more open to
new information, and processes it more carefully, such a negotiator is less
vulnerable to being misled by her own crude heuristics or by a need for self-
justification, and is more likely to make adjustments in the views or
assumptions with which she entered the negotiations. She is less likely to be
trapped by the fixed pie bias. She is more inclined to engage in forms of pre-
emptive self-awareness or self-criticism that enable her to more even-
handedly evaluate her options. And she is more inclined to engage in
"problem-solving behavior," to devote more energy to searching for ways to
solve problems. The more problem-solving behavior a negotiator exhibits,
the greater the likelihood that her conduct will increase levels of trust in her
by other participants in the process. As I discuss in greater detail, infra,
increases in levels of trust across party lines tend to improve the likelihood
that negotiators will identify a wider range of solution options. "
All of this sounds too good to be true. And it is-if we expect radical
changes in behavior and complete transformations of negotiating dynamics.
We would witness no such drama even if we could somehow quadruple the
process accountability or epistemic motivation that lawyers and litigants in
our mediations feel. Nonetheless, these studies should be important to us
because they identify the directions in which behaviors might well change,
even if only moderately, if we could induce the participants in our mediations
be a little more interested in why others make the decisions they do and to
feel at least a little more responsible for the character and productivity of the
process as a whole. One of the principal theses of this essay is that
persuading participants in our mediations to embrace the role of player/coach
holds some promise of moving them in these constructive directions.
20
Id. at 928.
21
Id. at 936-39; see infra note 26.
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C. Coaching by Mediators: Some Thoughts About Risks to Role and
Ethics
Coaching by a mediator, even in its most non-directive forms, represents
a form of intervention. As intervention, coaching can create risks to role and
ethics that cannot be wholly eliminated--even by the most circumspect and
thoughtful practitioners of the mediation art.
1. Social Darwinists and Equalitarian Transformationalists
Social Darwinists presumably would reject coaching of any kind in any
circumstance. 22 They want the litigation and negotiation chips to fall where
they believe "nature" intended, their path undisturbed by any artificial
interventions. If the strong can overpower or outwit the weak, so much the
better; "nature's way" is to cull the weak from the herd. A "pure" Social
Darwinist would feel that whatever outcome results from a negotiation that is
completely free from external restraints or inputs is the best and the only
appropriate result. How many litigators or litigants hold such views is not
clear to me. I suspect that the percentage of lawyers who would admit to
views so unvarnished is relatively small, but mediators might be well advised
not simply to proceed into even a restrained coaching role on the assumption
that no one harbors sentiments sounding in this spirit.
There also might be objections to coaching from the opposite end of the
philosophic spectrum. A proponent of purely "transformative" mediation
believes that the power and the beauty of this form of dispute resolution are
rooted in affirmations of the innate capacities of all human beings to
21
understand, work through, and solve the challenges they encounter. Any
form of coaching from an external source might appear to contradict this
premise. Coaching might seem to threaten to derail a participant's exploration
of her own resources and to prevent her from discovering the full range and
depth of her own capacities. In these ways, coaching might seem to threaten
to rob transformative mediation of its power to transform-to enable people
to find much more in themselves than they assume is there, to reconfigure,
fundamentally, their sense of self and their self-confidence, to instill a sense
22
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (Beacon
Press rev. ed. 1962).
23
See, e.g., R. BARUCH BUSH & J. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
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of ownership of solutions they craft, and to strengthen their motivation to
honor those solutions.
Objections to coaching that are rooted in views like these could be quite
telling for mediations in some settings or with some kinds of participants, but
they would be formidable in a much wider range of settings if the coaching
were done only by the "mediator" (as opposed to being done by everyone),
was aggressive, clumsily over-confident, closed-minded, directive-or
simply too frequent. A transformative critique of coaching would build, in
part, on an insight that deserves considered respect in most mediation
environments. There is a risk that the impulse to coach will be rooted
(sometimes quietly or subconsciously) in arrogance or condescension. Even
the simple impulse to "help" others can be accompanied by an
unselfconscious sense that there is a need to be met that the coach sees and
understands but that others do not. Believing that she understands the
problem, the coach might be tempted to believe that she knows how the
parties should go about addressing it. Self-regard in a mediator (in these
forms), even when it is oblique or muted, can be dangerous. It can discourage
parties' creativity, block access to important information and ideas, and
distort or shrivel what might otherwise be a productive or healthy dynamic
between parties.
On the other hand, declining to engage in any form of coaching-out of
fear of displacing the independence of the parties-also might reflect and
project a lack of confidence in the other participants in a mediation. By
appropriately asking coaching questions or presenting coaching ideas, and by
encouraging the other participants both to generate their own process ideas
and to join actively in assessing the wisdom of different possible paths
forward, a mediator in effect treats all the parties as her peers. She
demonstrates her confidence in their ability to compare options intelligently
and to make choices independently. In these ways, appropriate forms of
coaching might be more consistent with the spirit of transformative
mediation, and better advance its goals, than a mediator retreating into
complete process passivity. Reciprocal coaching affirms the mediator's belief
that all the participants in the process are fully capable of understanding and
evaluating coaching ideas, regardless of their source, and of doing so without
compromising the parties' creativity or their feeling of responsibility for their
circumstances and their decisions.
Nonetheless, it is important to continue to acknowledge that coaching, no
matter how thoughtfully undertaken, is a form of intervention, and as such,
could push a mediator closer to the center of the process and could lead some
or all of the parties to feel greater dependence on her. The closer to the center
of the process the mediator moves, the greater her responsibility becomes for
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its character and success, and the greater the risk becomes that she will
assume an essentially directive role.
To avoid a slide into role distortion, it is essential that the mediator-
coach take considerable care in how she plays her role. She should impose
restraints on her impulse to coach-so that she offers coaching inputs only
occasionally. She should present her coaching ideas in the form of questions
as much as possible. She should actively solicit evaluations of her ideas from
all participants. And she should invite and encourage everyone to generate
coaching (process) ideas of their own.
2. Opposite Routes to Disproportionate Responsibility
We also should bear in mind, however, that there are two (opposite)
courses of conduct by a mediator that could result in her acquiring some
responsibility for how a mediation plays out: over-coaching or, in some
circumstances, refusing to coach. "Responsibility" arguably should attach
when a mediator elects to take no action when it is clear that, by taking some
action, she could enable the parties to avoid serious, unintended and
unanticipated harm. I would contend that a mediator has a moral
responsibility to "intervene"-at least by asking questions designed to
encourage careful thinking about consequences-when she can foresee, with
considerable confidence, that a course of action proposed by one party in
caucus very likely would destroy, unnecessarily, any chance that the parties
could achieve constructive ends through the mediation. For example, I
believe that a mediator acquires some responsibility to do some coaching if
she knows, both from experience and from her interactions with a particular
plaintiff, that the session will come to an explosive and immediate end if the
defendant communicates (directly or through the mediator) a specific,
personally derogatory message. In such a circumstance, a mediator owes a
duty to both parties to help avoid an unnecessary catastrophe, at least by
asking the defendant to think through the purpose and the likely effect of
having the communication made.
3. Imperiling Neutrality?
Some kinds of coaching, or coaching in some circumstances, could
imperil a mediator's neutrality-or some parties' perceptions of her
neutrality. The purpose of conventional sports coaching, of course, is help
your side win. It follows that in our sports-saturated culture, there is a risk
that a party who feels that he is being coached (in caucus) by a mediator
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might slip into feeling that the mediator is on his side. Similarly, a party who
senses that the mediator is coaching her opponent might feel that he (the
mediator) has taken sides against her.
To reduce these risks, the mediator should emphasize, in her opening
remarks, that it is fundamental to her mission that she never take sides and
that she interact with everyone, in caucus or not, in the same way. She should
emphasize that she will engage in coaching conversations in the same spirit
with everyone, that her goal in such conversations is simply to make every
participant's thinking (including her own) about possible approaches or
process options as thorough and careful as possible. She should remind the
parties that her only "client" is the process itself, that the ultimate target of
everyone's coaching should be that process, and that the goal of all their
coaching should be to make that process as healthy and productive as
possible.
Another way to frame the same message is to say that an essential goal of
all coaching activity will be to avoid the kinds of mistakes that can lead to a
false (unnecessary) failure of the negotiations.
While conveying important truths, messages like these imply that there
always will be a clear distinction between help for the process as a whole and
help for an individual party. We need to recognize, however, that making a
coaching suggestion whose ultimate objective is to protect or improve the
process as a whole might, in some circumstances, result in delivering more
benefit to one party than the other. There is a possibility that by making a
particular coaching suggestion at a particular juncture, we would help one
party avoid making a negotiation mistake that would have put him at a
disadvantage or would have made it less likely that he would secure
favorable terms. Stated differently, when we declare that our goal is to help
all parties identify as reliably as possible what is possible through a mediated
negotiation, we may be glossing over a potentially uncomfortable fact: in
some circumstances, our coaching ideas might help one party gain access to
settlement terms that, if left to his own devices, he would never have
discovered. In other words, our coaching ideas might disable one party from
securing a more favorable outcome than he would have secured had we not
interjected a question or an idea that we intended, generally, not to inure to
the benefit of a particular party, but to enhance all parties' clarity about and
confidence in the process and, thus, to improve the likelihood that the parties
would reach an agreement.
Let's explore these issues more concretely through an example. Let's
assume that very early in a mediation, in a private caucus, plaintiffs lawyer
says: "We would accept a figure in the $100-$150 range. Please go tell the
defendant that." Let's further assume that in our local legal culture, we know
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that a defense lawyer who receives this message from plaintiffs counsel very
early in a negotiation will completely ignore the $150, will not hear anything
above $100, and will assume that what he is really being told is that the
plaintiff would settle for less than $100, probably significantly less.
In this circumstance, should a mediator consider engaging in any form of
coaching with plaintiff and his lawyer in caucus? Should a mediator say
anything to encourage plaintiffs counsel to think about how such a
communication might be interpreted by the other side, or how it might affect
the other side's expectations about how the negotiations might proceed or
where they might end up?
It is possible, of course, that the plaintiffs lawyer who wants to
communicate this message at this juncture in the mediation, fully understands
the sociology of the negotiation process and, in fact, does mean to signal that
his client would settle for less than $100. So, maybe the mediator should not
simply assume naivet6. But does it follow that the mediator should not
intervene by asking the sender if this is really the message he wants to
signal?
Should the mediator's thinking about this issue be affected by the level of
experience of plaintiffs lawyer? Should it matter if this lawyer has had many
years of experience with these kinds of cases? Or should it matter if the
lawyer for the defendant has much more experience and seems much more
worldly than counsel for plaintiff?
If the mediator were to ask plaintiffs counsel, in caucus, to think about
how the defendant might interpret such a message at this stage in the
negotiations, or what inferences the defendant might draw about plaintiffs
settlement intentions, would the mediator be taking a step toward "leveling
the playing field?" Would that be bad? Or, would the mediator simply be
trying to help a party avoid sending a signal that the party did not intend to
send and that, if sent, would make the negotiations less likely to be
successful by encouraging misplaced expectations in the defendant and
generating anger?
24
Many situations could raise a similar set of issues for a mediator. For example,
what, if anything, should a mediator do if plaintiffs counsel asks the mediator to take the
following question to the defendant: "Would you (defendant) offer $200 if my client
would lower his demand to $600?" Should the mediator ask plaintiff and her counsel how
the defendant is likely to interpret this question, i.e., what the defendant might think this
question is signaling? Should the mediator suggest that the defendant might interpret this
question as signaling that plaintiff would accept an offer at the mid-point between these
two figures, i.e., $400?
If the mediator were to take this question on behalf of the plaintiff to the defendant,
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Sending a misleading signal, or an unintended signal, could hurt the
overall mediation process and the prospects of finding mutually agreeable
terms, e.g., by confusing the defendant or by making him angry, more rigid,
or less trusting when the plaintiffs true intentions become clear. Thus, by
helping one side avoid sending a misleading message, the mediator could be
helping both parties by preventing an unnecessary source of confusion or
resentment from polluting the process.
But a coaching intervention in this circumstance is likely to yield more
benefit to the plaintiffs side than to the defense side. Only the plaintiff and
his lawyer will learn from this private dialogue with the mediator, and only
the plaintiff and his lawyer will have avoided taking a step that might have
pushed the negotiations into zones that would yield either a less favorable
settlement or no settlement at all. At a minimum, the mediator's coaching
would have made the process less difficult for the plaintiff, and would have
prevented the plaintiff from having to labor arduously to get the negotiations
out of the lower ranges into which the plaintiff never wanted them to
descend.
The question is: should a mediator refrain from any kind of coaching
intervention in a situation like this because, at least in some sense, one side is
likely to benefit more directly than the other side? My personal answer is no.
I think the mediator should take the step that promises to enhance the
viability of the process as a whole, unless the benefit the coaching
intervention is likely to deliver is more clearly and more substantially
disproportionate (i.e., benefits one side more directly than the other) than it
would be in this example. This answer suggests that "neutrality" can be a
complicated and sometimes elusive concept.
In working through how to honor the duty to remain neutral, a mediator
should take into account not only the direct or immediate effects of her
possible courses of action, but also their less direct but potentially significant
(sometimes essential and positive) impact on the character or quality of the
mediation process as a whole-and, thus, on overall prospects for helping all
parties identify what kinds of terms are accessible through a mediated
negotiation. Stated differently, by helping prevent one side from
unknowingly causing potentially significant harm to the process as a whole,
the mediator also is helping, by that same intervention, the other side.
should the mediator 'coach' the defendant not to respond with a simple "yes" unless the
defendant intends to signal that it would pay $400 to get the case settled?
More generally, should a mediator 'coach' parties about what signals are likely to be
sent by making proposals that appear to take the form of bracketing?
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In sum, I believe that a coaching step taken by a mediator whose purpose
and effect is to help both sides by averting needless damage to the process as
a whole would not compromise the mediator's neutrality.
4. Imperiling Confidentiality
Coaching of some kinds or in some circumstances also might imperil a
mediator's promise to protect parties' confidences. There is a risk that, in
raising questions or offering suggestions to one party during a caucus, a
mediator might inadvertently or indirectly disclose secret information she
had acquired earlier from another party. A lawyer who hears a mediator's
question or suggestion might well wonder: "Where did that come from?" or
"What does the fact that the mediator asked that question indicate about what
the mediator has learned from or about the other side?" The answer might be
"nothing"-but a mediator must take care to be sure that that actually is the
answer before she makes a comment or offers a suggestion.
A mediator must recognize that counsel often analyze (silently) her
comments or questions to see if they might contain any clues or signals about
what the other side is telling the mediator or is thinking (or about what the
mediator is thinking but not disclosing).
Because lawyers so often look for embedded signals in mediator's
questions, suggestions, or comments, it is especially important that a
mediator who does not intend to send a signal through a question, suggestion,
or comment say so explicitly and with emphasis.
There is a risk, of course, that counsel will not believe the mediator, but
that is a possibility that is beyond the mediator's control as long as she takes
care not to indirectly disclose information acquired from an opponent in
confidence.
The risk is not simply that the mediator will disclose a confidential
verbal communication; the more subtle risk is that, through a comment or
suggestion, the mediator will disclose an impression she has gained from her
private interactions with a party about the kinds of things that are most
important to that party or the kinds of proposals that he is likely to find
attractive. Parties are likely to have a legitimate expectation that such
impressions, when based on confidential communications and private
interactions, will not be disclosed by the mediator. These expectations
require mediators to proceed thoughtfully, and with great care when they
respond to questions posed by opposing parties or make suggestions to them.
One not-uncommon situation illuminates well this kind of risk. Assume
that from extensive caucusing with plaintiff and his attorney, a mediator has
developed a clear sense of the dollar range within which the plaintiff would
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agree to settle. When caucusing with the defense team, defense counsel asks,
point blank: "What should my client offer?" The mediator knows the range of
figures within which the deal could be struck. What should she do? Should
she coach the defendants to offer a number at the high end of the range? In
the middle of the range? At the bottom of the range? Can the mediator coach
in any way in this circumstance? In my view, it would be unethical for the
mediator to suggest any "number" (or range) to the defendant in this
situation, because suggesting a number or range would involve the mediator
in moving the likely terms of an agreement in a direction that was favorable
to one side or to the other and could violate the confidence or confidences of
the plaintiff. Faced with this dilemma, I think a mediator must put the ball
back in the defendant's court, by saying something like:
"I'm sorry, I can't suggest a number. But I think it would be
most helpful ifyou and your client would work through your own
thoughts about this. What are the things that should get some play
in arriving at your number? How might plaintiff respond to or
interpret various proposals or offers you might consider making?
And why do you think plaintiff would respond the way you
anticipate? By thinking these things through independently, the
proposal you make will really be yours; you'll feel better about
making it."
As the preceding paragraphs acknowledge, coaching creates risks-risks
to maintaining an appropriate role and to honoring our ethical obligations.
Despite these risks, I believe that we would disserve the parties on whose
behalf we labor if we refused to consider engaging in any kind of coaching. I
believe that through appropriate forms of coaching in appropriate
circumstances we can deliver real net value to litigants and lawyers-real net
value as measured by the parties' values, real net value that might well
remain inaccessible to them without our coaching. Our highest purpose is to
serve others, not to protect ourselves from stressful dilemmas or risks of
error. We should cultivate the courage to risk some of our sometimes
precious self-regard to try to advance the interests of others. By mustering
this courage we evidence respectful confidence in the parties' competence
and independence, along with belief in our mission and trust in our
commitment to its pursuit.
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V. NAVIGATING THE TRUST TEMPTATION
A. Part One: Trust in Us
One of the most significant generalizations to emerge from social science
research about negotiation" is that there tends to be a dynamic, mutually
reinforcing relationship in bargaining between the sharing of information, the
development or expansion of trust, and the extent to which negotiators are
inclined to adopt a "problem-solving" approach to the process.2 Because trust
seems to contribute so much to improving the prospects for productive
negotiations, mediators understandably might be tempted to try to elevate the
level of trust in the negotiations they host. The paragraphs that follow
explore what I call "the trust temptation," dividing the topic into two
sections, the first focusing on issues related to trust of the mediator, the
second focusing on issues related to trust across party lines (as well as trust
between a lawyer and his own client).
Should we, as mediators, try to elevate parties' trust in us in order to try
to elevate trust levels, generally, in a mediation? This is not a simple or self-
answering question.
Because we are inclined to trust ourselves, because we want to feel
connected to and respected by the parties, because we want to be liked by
everyone, and because we really do want to help the parties settle their
dispute (and to have them believe that we helped them settle their dispute),
we are likely to feel a keen temptation to encourage the parties to trust us.
This is a temptation whose power we need to acknowledge-and that we
need to manage.
At least in some circumstances, we risk doing serious violence to our
25
As noted earlier, the findings that support these generalizations were made,
primarily, in studies of negotiations that presented at least some opportunities for
integrative solutions. We cannot transport with full confidence findings from these kinds
of settings to negotiations with no integrative potential. Even in aggressively litigated
cases, however, many mediations offer some opportunity for integrative bargaining.
Moreover, I am not aware of studies that demonstrate that lessons repeatedly learned
from studies of bargaining in circumstances with integrative potential have no validity in
bargaining that negotiators approach as if it were purely distributive. Until findings from
future research might suggest that it would be unwise to do so, I think it is appropriate to
assume that we can draw inferences that are useful in a wide range of negotiating settings
from the research that supports the ideas presented in this essay.
26
See, e.g., Butler, Jr., supra note 11. See also sources discussed in Volkema &
Rivers, supra note 9.
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roles, our ethics, and the mediation process if we encourage or permit the
parties to trust us too much or about the wrong things. At a general level,
there is a risk that if the parties trust us too much they will depend on us too
much. If they depend on us too much, we compromise our access to them as
potentially vital sources of ideas, information, and energy. If they trust us too
much, or about the wrong things, they will look too much to us for guidance,
which can become direction, and the more they look to us, the less they will
look to themselves. By encouraging parties to trust us too much, and about
the wrong things, we encourage them to abandon their roles as coaches. If
they abandon their roles as coaches, their sense of responsibility for the
quality of the mediation can decline (markedly), and as that sense of
responsibility declines, so can the quality of the process and the prospects for
its success.
There are some subjects or matters for which it is particularly dangerous
and particularly tempting to encourage parties to trust us. Parties and lawyers
often look to us for a substantive second opinion, i.e., about the merits or
viability of the claims and defenses. In litigated cases, when parties are
paying their mediator, they may feel that such opinions are the most valuable
or useful form of service the mediator can provide. This may be all well and
good - but only up to a point. We run considerable risk, in my view, if we
encourage parties to trust too much in the reliability and sophistication of our
substantive analyses or in the accuracy of our predictions. This risk has at
least two sources: One is our always limited information base. The second is
the very real possibility that, even if we had access to all the information in
every party's secret storerooms, our analyses would be flawed or our
predictions would be wrong.
As mediators, we never know the whole story. Parties tell us only some
things, not everything. Even if they think they have told us everything, which
is uncommon, they haven't-because they can't know in advance everything
that might turn out to be significant. Purporting to offer sound analyses or to
make solid predictions on such infirm and incomplete grounds can be
foolish, dishonest, or both.
During my twenty-five years on the bench, I found it extremely difficult
to predict accurately how a jury would resolve a civil case that had survived
a motion for summary judgment. My predictions about such matters often
have been dead wrong, even when I have made them while a jury was
deliberating, i.e., after I had watched all the evidence come in, heard all the
arguments, and instructed the jury in the law. I really believe that a jury trial,
is a sui generis event-a one-time only historical factum that, fundamentally,
is not replicable. It follows that if we as mediators purport to know how a
jury trial will play out in cases that can survive motions for summary
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judgment; we deceive both ourselves and anyone who might listen to us.
These are matters about which we cannot responsibly ask the parties to trust
us.
We need to be forthcoming and proactive in acknowledging the limits on
our ability to analyze and predict reliably. We need to acknowledge openly
that we don't have access to all the significant information, and that, even if
we did, it is essentially impossible to predict accurately the outcome of a case
that has survived a motion for summary judgment. Then, we need to preface
any substantive analytical inputs we offer or any second opinions we
provide, with substantial, clear, and unequivocal qualifications and
conditions.
By doing so, we do not render ourselves substantively useless. Instead,
the qualifiers and conditions we identify can be valuable sources of learning
for the parties: integral parts of a useful second opinion and important
reminders that the civil litigation process remains an intellectually fragile
undertaking.
Moreover, by openly and actively qualifying our substantive inputs, we
shift the parties' "trust focus" to appropriate targets: our sincerity, our
honesty, our comprehension of the complexity of the situation the parties
confront, and our appreciation of the fact that we can be truly helpful to
others only by doggedly maintaining our intellectual and moral integrity.
These are the kinds of things we can encourage the parties to trust in us.
There are others. We can encourage the parties to trust how much we
want to be helpful to them. We can encourage them to trust our energy and
our tenacity.27 Our patience. Our interest in learning and our desire to listen.
Our desire to think carefully and our ability to think systematically. Our
refusal to resort to deception or manipulation. And our commitment to honor
the promises we have made to the parties to preserve the confidentiality of
their private communications with us and to protect the independence of their
decision-making.
These are targets of trust of considerable potential significance to parties.
By earning the parties' trust in so many important arenas, we can contribute
appreciably to elevating the "trust dimension" of the mediation.
What are some of the ways that we might increase parties' trust in us in
these appropriate and potentially important arenas?
Before the mediation: be sure that your first interaction with parties is not
ex parte, but joint. If you have ex parte communications before the session,
27
Opinion surveys by Goldberg and Shaw indicate that these kinds of qualities are
extremely important to users of mediation services. See Goldberg & Shaw, supra note 7.
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be sure that (1) all parties know that you will or might have such
communications and that (2) all parties know that they have an equal
opportunity for such communications.
Before the mediation, consider hosting a meeting or phone conference
with parties to present yourself and to explain your philosophy and approach.
During a mediation, in your opening statement, talk explicitly about what
you will not do to try to push parties toward settlement:
"I will not lie to, mislead, or manipulate anyone. Preserving
my sense of self is more important to me than getting your case
settled. As significant, it would compromise my ability to help you
(the parties) ifyou could not trust me.
One of our primary goals today will be to try to identify as
reliably as possible what is possible through this process. In that
central undertaking, I can be useful to you only if I tell you the
truth."
"This does not mean that I will disclose everything that a party
tells me in caucus. As I have explained, I will keep secrets when I
am asked by a party to do so. But I will not pretend not to have a
secret when I have one. If asked a question whose answer would
require me to reveal a secret, I will say, 'I have a secret about that.
I'm not going to answer that question.'
"And I will not resort to theatrics or emotion (feigned or
otherwise) to try to manipulate anyone for any purpose. I will not
feign disappointment with anyone to try to get him to change a
position.
Nor will I pretend that I have worked magic on the other side
to get them to improve their offer."
If asked during a caucus to mislead or lie to the other side, or to pressure
the other side, explicitly refuse to do so, without anger or self-righteousness.
For example:
(A) One party asks you in caucus to "Tell them X." (X being untrue)
Mediator's response: "I'm sorry, I can't do that."
(B) One party asks you in caucus to, "Tell them this is the most I can get
out of them."
Mediator's response: "I'm sorry I can't do that."
A calm refusal like this can teach the people with whom you are in
caucus something important about you - that you are trustworthy. It should
increase their confidence that what you tell them during the course of the
mediation is true.
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Some mediators would be tempted, in such situations, not to confirm to
the requesting party what they intended to do with this message, and then to
"re-frame" it before joining the caucus with the opposing party. The product
of such re-framing could take a wide range of shapes, some of which would
essentially eviscerate the intended message. In my view, resorting to such re-
framing without telling the message-sending party is ethically ambiguous at
best, and does nothing to encourage the kind of trust in the mediator that
might enhance the overall trust environment of the mediation.
During a mediation, visibly take care not to validate, directly or
indirectly, in caucus or in joint sessions, the use of any unethical or
manipulative negotiating tactics. And tell the parties briefly about the
research (described in a subsequent section) that indicates that resorting to
such tactics can cause considerable harm to the prospects for a successful
negotiation.
In caucuses, do not make negative comments about other participants in
the mediation and do not appear to endorse negative comments from a party
or lawyer about others. While it might be appropriate in some settings to
carefully express or endorse a skeptical or negative analysis of parties'
positions, we should make it clear that our critiques are of law and evidence,
not of persons. If we make or endorse negative comments in private about
others, the parties with whom we are speaking privately will worry that we
are saying negative things about them when we are caucusing with the other
side.
B. One Especially Significant Variation on the Trust (Us) Theme:
Delivering Value by Helping Parties Feel That It's OK to Say Yes
In some situations, one of the services the parties look to a mediator to
provide, perhaps subconsciously, is psychological cover for decisions the
parties need and, at some level, want to make. Sometimes the parties want
the mediator to make difficult decisions for them. This we must decline to
do. Perhaps more often, however, parties look to the mediator's views for
comfort or for reassurance as they try to resolve imponderables and to make
very difficult decisions.
The subjects on which decision-making turns in mediations often are
pervaded with uncertainty. When parties or lawyers confront such palpable
uncertainty, they understandably are tempted to look to a mediator for help-
for something that will reduce the anxiety that the uncertainty provokes.
They look for at least some kind of oblique validation or support for what
feels to them like a decision that is impossible to make on a fully rational
basis. Sometimes clients do not have full confidence in the advice they are
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receiving from their lawyers; clients who have considerable respect for their
lawyers nonetheless understand that, because of nature of the analytical
challenge, not even the most competent assessments are infallible. Even
experienced, repeat players often feel some need to justify their decisions to
others and to themselves-to be able to explain or to live with those
decisions and their consequences. They want to sleep at night. The more
support they can locate for a difficult decision, the better their sleep is likely
to be. Therefore, they sometimes look to their mediator for help, reassurance,
or a steadying arm, as they try to navigate toward these elusive emotional
places.
One of the subtle, sometimes complicated ethical challenges mediators
face is how to respond to these kinds of completely understandable needs.
Because we want so much to be helpful and to reach out and connect, it often
is incredibly tempting to rush in with high levels of reassurance, and thus to
be perceived as "adding value" by providing what the parties really want,
even if we know that what they are searching for is, at least in some measure,
illusory.
It is at these crucial junctures that we must be most careful not to over-
encourage or abuse the parties' trust in us. It is at these junctures that it is
important to be forthright about our limitations-clear that there is an
inescapable vulnerability in anyone's predictions about how the case might
play out or in anyone's judgment about what is wise.
It does not follow, however, that a mediator should never share with a
party an honest feeling or instinct about what course of action seems wisest.
Before moving in that direction (presumably very late in the process);
however, we must take special care to assess the integrity of such feelings. It
will be tempting to "feel" that it is "wise" for a party to make the move or to
accept the terms that we believe or sense will get the deal done. We covet the
emotional high that a settlement agreement delivers. Because we covet that
high, we need to watch ourselves and not permit our ideas about what is wise
to be overrun by our sense of what needs to be done to get a deal.
However, if we really try to disentangle our feelings about what is wise
from our desire simply to get a deal and if we share our views with
appropriate qualifiers and deference, we ought to be able to provide at least
represented parties with this kind of service without running afoul of our
consciences. My comfort with this view grows if (1) the request for our sense
of how the case might play out is made toward the end of a lengthy and
careful set of negotiations and if (2) the original source of the proposed terms
is the party that is asking for the guidance, for example, when a party says "I
think I would like to propose X; do you think that would be unwise?"
We are all human. We know that we really don't know. At the end of a
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long negotiation that has included wise coaching, the parties understand that
none of us can be certain what the wisest course is. But we also know that
their feelings of fear and uncertainty can be pointlessly damaging. Given our
commitment to try be of service to people, it is not clear to me why, with
appropriate circumspection, it would be inappropriate or unethical to share a
view about what would seem wise when such sharing could help the parties
suffer less.
C. Part Two: Trust in the Other Side
Should mediators try to encourage parties to trust one another? There is a
great temptation to answer this question in the affirmative because there
seems to be so much evidence that (1) enhancing trust across party lines can
enhance the quality and productivity of a mediation and (2) behaviors rooted
in distrust are ubiquitous and potentially very damaging to negotiation
dynamics. Let's look at some of the relevant social science findings before
we confront the issue head on.
The environments in which settlement negotiations in civil cases take
place are permeated with uncertainty-as is the settlement negotiation
process itself. Social science research suggests the likelihood that people will
resort to heuristics2 increases with the complexity and uncertainty of tasks
they face. 9 Not surprisingly, research has shown that negotiators commonly
bring a limiting set of heuristics to the negotiation process, i.e., that they
enter the process with the clarity and openness of their thinking already
compromised by widespread "biases" (a term often used as a synonym for
heuristics in the social science literature). One such heuristic that is very
common is called "the fixed pie bias," meaning that people quite often enter a
negotiation assuming that their object or target will be "a fixed pie" and that
their goal is to get as big a piece of that pie as possible.30 This bias often is
28
Heuristics are mental short cuts or biases, presumptions or inferences triggered
after multiple encounters with what are perceived to be similarly configured
circumstances. While some heuristics can be essential to avoid sensory overload and
chaos, they often are relatively crude and more than occasionally are misplaced (wrong).
See, e.g., MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BRAZERMAN, COGNTHON AND RATIONALITY IN
NEGOTIATION 43-60 (1991).
29
3o See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 14, at 135.
See Margaret A. Neale & Gregory B. Northcraft, Experience, Expertise, and
Decision-Bias in Negotiation: The Role of Strategic Conceptualization, in 2 RESEARCH
ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (Blair H. Sheppard, Max H. Brazerman, & Roy J.
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accompanied by an expectation that negotiating counterparts (the people on
the other side) will engage in distributive or competitive bargaining, perhaps
pretending to be interested in expanding the size of the pie but really being
interested only in taking as much of it home for themselves as possible.
According to social scientists, biases like these can significantly color
how a negotiator interprets or understands the conduct of her counterpart.
Thus, a negotiator who expects her counterpart to bargain distributively " is
less likely to perceive constructive motives behind acts by her counterpart
and more likely to fail to perceive genuine invitations to engage in problem
solving approaches. Expecting a counterpart to negotiate distributively also
inhibits a negotiator from taking the risks that sometimes are necessary to
achieve high quality agreements.33 Social scientists also have learned that the
biases negotiators bring to their interactions with their counterparts can be
tenacious-tending to remain intact even in the face of conduct that
contradicts negative expectations.34
There is some silver lining. The fact that negotiators tend to respond in
kind to how they think their counterpart is negotiating means, on the one
hand, that a negotiator is more likely to be deceitful or difficult if she
believes her counterpart is being deceitful or difficult, but, on the other hand,
she is more likely to share information if she perceives her counterpart to be
sharing information. Furthermore, as noted above, there tends to be a positive
relationship between levels of trust and sharing information.
Taken together, these apparent facts of negotiation life could provide
mediators with powerful incentives to try to increase levels of trust across
party lines. We must be very careful, however, about how we respond to
such incentives. To try to encourage parties directly to trust one another can
be quite dangerous.
A mediator who tries to form a judgment about how trustworthy a party
is undertakes a perilous task. We do not know enough and we are not smart
or wise enough to make such judgments. If we try, there is a considerable
risk that we will be wrong. We simply can't know, for example, how accurate
Lewicki eds., 1999). See also Roy J. LEWICKI, DAVID M. SAUNDERS, JOHN W. MINTON &
BRUCE BARRY, NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 151-52 (4th ed. 2003).
31
See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Contending With Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A
Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963
(1998).
See, e.g., Tinsley et al., supra note 11, at 624-25.
33
Id. at 623-24.
34
Id.
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or complete a party's representations to us are, even when made under the
protection of secrecy in a private caucus. Given the limitations under which
we work, it would be irresponsible to offer direct assessments of the
reliability of other parties' representations, or generally, of their bona fides.
Moreover, offering such assessments or assurances would tend to move us
toward the center of the mediation process, increasing the risk that our inputs
would take on pivotal, rather than clearly secondary or merely
supplementary, roles.
It is far wiser for a mediator to work on the cross-party trust problem
indirectly. What follows are a few ideas about ways to go about this.
Before a mediation, consider hosting a face-to-face pre-mediation
meeting whose sole purpose would be to introduce or re-introduce the parties
to one another-to try to humanize the players in one another's minds. This
kind of meeting could be especially useful if considerable time has passed
since the events or interactions occurred that gave rise to the lawsuit, creating
time for feelings to subside and perspectives to broaden. The mediator also
could use such a meeting to help parties identify categories of information
they would share and to promote energetic commitments to making the
mediation as productive as possible.
If a face-to-face meeting in advance of the mediation is impractical (as it
often will be), encourage the lawyers to have their clients on the line during
the pre-mediation phone conference. During this conference, very briefly
describe the key findings about how preconceptions and defensive
expectations can needlessly damage the productivity of a mediation, and
about the positives that ensue when parties are willing to share more
information.
Consider working ex parte with each lawyer and party team before and
during the mediation to help them identify information they could take the
initiative to share with the other side, e.g., in their written pre-mediation
statements. Explain how much credibility a party can earn by sharing
information that might be in some measure self-revelatory, or that might shed
light on underlying interests, or that might have ambiguous or even some
potentially damaging implications.
Raising this topic in an ex parte setting would be less threatening to
counsel and would permit more forthcoming conversations about what kind
of information a party might share without feeling that it was exposing itself
to too much risk.
Point out (before and during the mediation) that one kind of information
that a party might share with positive effect is why she is making a particular
proposal (especially a non-monetary proposal), or what thinking underlies
her views about terms that are under consideration.
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The act of disclosing the "why" behind a party's proposal or position can
that party seem more rational (and a party who seems more rational may
seem fairer). The act of disclosing "why" could contribute to trust-building
and could help encourage an opponent to do a little more sharing.
In addition, by disclosing the goals or purposes or concerns that underlie
asking for a particular term or taking a particular position, a party enables her
counterpart and the mediator to look for alternative ways to achieve the same
goals-alternative ways that might be more effective or might be less painful
to the counterpart.
D. Concession Making, Respect and Trust
Levels of trust across party lines also can be affected by how parties
handle concession-making during a negotiation. Sophisticated analysts of
negotiation dynamics teach us that considerable indirect communication can
accompany different approaches to the concession-making process." A party
who refuses to reciprocate for a concession made by his counter-part, or
whose responsive concession appears to be untethered to comprehensible
considerations, runs considerable risk of damaging her counter-part's self-
esteem or triggering fear of damage to her reputation.36 Thus, a thoughtless or
overly-aggressive response to a concession not only can reduce trust across
party lines, but also can unnecessarily create an additional source of
psychological resistance to making subsequent adjustments in positions.
In sharp contrast, appropriately framed concessions, or reciprocations to
concessions, can communicate acknowledgment not only of another party's
position and its underpinnings, but also (indirectly) of the other party
himself." A reciprocal concession can be a form of cross-party recognition,
an oblique but meaningful acknowledgment that there is a self on the other
side. In other words, a party might experience or feel an opponent's
movement toward his position as a movement toward himself. This kind of
acknowledgment or recognition of person or position can reduce tensions or
antagonisms across party lines. Reducing tensions may reduce suspicions or
levels of defensiveness, or may dilute self-protective instincts. Lowering
suspicions and reducing self-protective animatice can create at least a little
35
See J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK: How TO MEDIATE INSURED
CLAIMS AND OTHER MONETARY DISPUTES (2007).
36
LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 50--54.
37
Id.
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more space for trust to grow-even if only slowly or very incrementally.
So, how a litigant handles concessions can either inflict damage on the
negotiation process or can improve its emotional dimensions.
Share (in a compact way) these insights with a party who, in caucus,
refuses to consider making adjustments to its position or to respond at all to a
concession made by an opponent, or who seems to have devoted no thought
to the effect that taking a rigid position might have on other parties or the
vitality of the negotiation process. Suggest that it is important to avoid
needlessly inflicting emotional wounds-and that an opportunity to
reciprocate can be an opportunity to evidence good faith and to encourage
more confidence across party lines. The mediator might add: "It can be
important not to give the [plaintiff or defendant] an incentive to look for
revenge, or to make him feel that he needs to extract a pound of flesh during
the rest of negotiations in order to restore his self-respect or his reputation
with the people who will pass judgment on how he has handled this process."
Social science research has generated two additional findings about
concession making that, while not directly related to improving trust across
party lines, could help mediators and parties avoid process errors that might
needlessly compromise the health of negotiations. The first of these is that
the level of parties' satisfaction with the negotiation process (as well as with
its outcome) is likely to be higher if the negotiations have included multiple
rounds of concessions than if the negotiations have included only a few such
rounds." The second of these findings is that immediate concessions are
likely to be perceived as less valuable than concessions that are made after
more substantial periods of negotiating." A mediator might cite these
findings in support of the following coaching ideas:
* Don't rush to the numbers.
* Urge parties to leave sufficient room between positions they take
early in the negotiation process and the terms they ultimately would
accept to permit several rounds of exchanges of offers and demands
(or packages of term proposals).
* Don't make big concessions quickly; instead, make concessions on a
38
See, e.g., A. D. Galinsky, V. L. Seiden, P. H. Kim, & V. H. Medvec, The
Dissatisfaction of Having Your First Offer Accepted: The Role of Counterfactual
Thinking in Negotiations, 28 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 271 (2002).
39
LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 51 (citing S. Kwon & L. R. Weingart, Unilateral
Concessions from the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiation
Judgments. 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 263 (2004)).
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measured basis and on a deliberately paced track.
* Be very patient with the negotiation process. Leave plenty of time at
each juncture for parties to adjust both analytically and emotionally
to potential changes in circumstances, new information, etc.
VI. POINTING PARTIES TOWARD MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACHES
A. Postulates About Negotiation Dynamics Based On Social Science
Research
Based on careful analysis of studies of negotiation dynamics, Roger
Volkema and Cheryl Rivers have developed a wide-ranging set of
"postulates" about how negotiators are likely to behave when they encounter
(or believe they are encountering) specific circumstances or specific kinds of
behavior from their negotiating counterparts. 40 The principal targets of
analysis by these social scientists are what they call "ethically ambiguous
negotiation tactics" (EANTS). As defined by these scholars, EANTS include
a broad range of negotiating behaviors, ranging from the relatively
commonplace and less clearly unethical (e.g., exaggerating a client's
expectations or demands, not disclosing potentially significant information,
or hiding a bottom line) to the more extreme and more widely condemned
(e.g., encouraging a counterpart to draw an inaccurate inference about a
material fact, misrepresenting material facts, or making threats).
Volkema and Rivers contend that there is a greater risk that negotiations
(at least in matters with integrative potential) will fail completely, or will fail
to yield optimum outcomes, when both parties use EANTS. In their view, the
relevant research also indicates that there is a considerable risk of damage to
negotiation dynamics even if only one participant uses EANTS.
The specific postulates that Volkema and Rivers have developed are
designed to help negotiators and mediators predict negative reactions to some
negotiating techniques and to help parties and neutrals choose behavioral
40
See Volkema & Rivers, supra note 9. But see D. Fleck, R. Volkema, S. Pereira, B.
Levy & L. Vaccari, Neutralizing Unethical Negotiating Tactics: An Empirical
Investigation of Approach Selection and Effectiveness, 30 NEGOT. J. 23, 43 (2014). A
very recently completed study of negotiation dynamics in simulated settings that failed to
yield substantial evidence that using positive negotiation behaviors would significantly
reduce the likelihood that a counterpart would use EANTS, at least when the negotiations
are conducted only via email and when the simulated problem does not clearly present
substantial integrative opportunities.
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paths that might move negotiation dynamics in productive directions. This
section presents some of these postulates, followed in each instance by
coaching suggestions arising therefrom.
Postulate: If a negotiator suspects his counterpart is using or likely to
use EANTS, the negotiator is likely to use EANTS in return in order to
protect himself.
Coaching Point: In caucus, when parties are considering what to do next
in negotiations, a mediator who is concerned about how the other side might
perceive or react to one of the moves or next steps a party seems inclined to
make might ask:
"How might the other side view this move, or react to it?"
"Is there a risk that proceeding this way might needlessly make the other
side more suspicious, defensive, or rigid?"
Or, a coach might say, in caucus: "It is important to minimize the risk
that the other side will misperceive or misconstrue what you are doing, or get
suspicious about what lies beneath this [act or move], because if that
happens, [studies indicate that] the other side will look for ways to protect
itself and to retaliate-and will give us less information and be less flexible."
Postulate: The more negotiators feel that they have in common-
personally and/or professionally-the less likely they are to use EANTS.
Corollary: The more parties look to the same external sources for
validation, reputation, business, etc., the less likely they are to use EANTS.
Coaching Points: At various junctures over the course of a mediation,
emphasize values or experiences or challenges that both parties share. When
trying to get leverage on whether a position is well taken or a proposal is
"fair," search for external sources of norms that both parties respect or by
which both parties might be judged (e.g., by peers, by possible business
partners, or by customers).
Postulate: The more a negotiator believes that his opponent could help
him gain influence with or access to important business or social
opportunities, the less likely the negotiator is to use EANTS.
Coaching Points: Before and during negotiations, make sure the parties
think about whether there is any possibility that in the future they might form
a relationship (like a joint venture) or find other ways to work together that
would benefit both of them. Look for ways that one party might help the
other party develop or improve a relationship with someone else, or might
help enhance the other party's reputation or standing in relevant quarters, e.g.,
through a press release or direct messages to customers, or through an
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advertisement, or through coordinated presentations at trade shows.
Postulate: The less attractive the alternatives to a negotiated agreement,
the less likely a negotiator is to use EANTS.
Coaching Point: Make sure each party fully understands, in detail and in
specifics, what proceeding with the litigation would entail, in cost, time, and
in uncertainty of circumstances, as well as in indirect effects like diversion of
otherwise productive resources, stress, impact on reputation, undermining the
confidence of customers, etc.
Postulate: The more a party believes his opponent has viable options to a
negotiated agreement, the less likely the negotiator is to use EANTS.
Coaching Point: When caucusing with one party, be careful not to
overstate the down-sides to the other party of proceeding with the litigation
(or the risks/burdens to the other party).
Postulate: Generally, the farther out in the future a party will feel the
negative effects of the terms of a deal, the more willing he will be to accept
those terms.
Coaching Point: Look for ways to delay or postpone some of the
negative consequences of some or all of the terms of a deal, e.g., through
installment payments, or by giving a business more time to depart a market
or to transition to a modified product.
B. Coaching to Help Parties Avoid "Cognitive Traps"
Social scientists have identified a number of commonly encountered
"cognitive traps" that can distort mediation dynamics and whose avoidance
can enhance prospects for productive negotiations. 4' This section identifies a
few of those traps and offers suggestions about how to coach parties around
them.
1. Asymmetries in Loss Aversion
Research indicates that, as a general proposition, people are likely to
experience more hurt from loss than pleasure from gain. They are likely to
give more weight to a sure loss than to a merely possible gain, and to prefer a
41
See generally LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 150-54; Neale & Bazerman,
supra note 14, at 41-79.
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smaller sure gain to a bigger gain that is only a possibility.42
One manifestation of these principles arises when out of pocket costs are
clearly measurable and relatively certain, but opportunity costs are
appreciably more difficult to measure and less certain. In this situation, many
negotiators may be inclined to give more weight to smaller out of pocket
costs than to potentially much larger (but more remote or less visible)
opportunity costs.
Coaching Points: Slow parties down when they are trying to assess the
indirect costs of failing to resolve their dispute by agreement; if appropriate,
encourage them to give appropriate consideration and weight to the longer
range or more indirect "costs" that are more difficult to measure. If
circumstances permit, help parties understand concessions as foregone gains
rather than as hard losses. Encourage a defendant not to abandon negotiations
without first making a final firm offer, as generous and as concretized as
possible. Turning down such an offer would involve giving up a sure gain in
favor of an only possible larger gain in the future. In some settings it might
be wise to suggest that a plaintiff plan to keep his demands on the high side
of where the case might settle until the very last move is necessary, then be
prepared to forego the last gain instead of asking the defendant to bear the
last loss.
2. The Endowment Effect
The concept of an "endowment effect" has been used in a variety of
ways in sophisticated social science literature, but for present purposes I will
use this phrase to capture a relatively straightforward proposition: when a
person thinks about the value of an object that could be sold or bought, there
is a tendency to ascribe a higher value to the object if the person already
possesses the object than if the person does not possess it and is considering
purchasing it.43 Stated less carefully, the simple fact of possessing a thing
42
See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RES. 235, 243-45 (1993).
43 I draw extensively in this section on recent work by Jennifer Arlen & Stephan W.
Tontrup, A Process Account of the Endowment Effect: Voluntary Debiasing Through
Agents and Markets (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & NYU Law and Econ., Research
Paper No 13-26, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2263447 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.2263447.
Professsor Arlen suggests that in the relevant social science literature the endowment
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seems to incline a person to elevate its value.
Social scientists have suggested that the endowment effect can have
roots in a person fearing that he will experience a feeling of regret after
parting with something he possesses. He fears feeling regret over the item's
loss. Research also suggests, however, that institutional repeat players (who
might serve as a client's agent) become much less vulnerable to such feelings
as they engage in multiple transactions and as they experience, repeatedly,
the ups and downs of markets and deals." Because they are less likely to be
"biased" by fear of feeling regret over loss, transaction professionals, in
theory, are better positioned than the "owners" on whose behalf they work to
determine the "rational" market value of an item that their owner possesses.
These findings and insights tend to support a proposition that might
be useful to lawyers representing clients in mediations and, secondarily, to
mediators. Work by Professors Jennifer Arlen and Stephan W. Tontrup45
suggests that we might be able to mitigate the 'biasing' of settlement
decision-making (or the resistance to trading) that is attributable to the
endowment effect if we could dilute the parties' sense of responsibility for
the outcome of a negotiation by helping them transfer some of that sense of
responsibility to their agents, namely, their lawyers. It is, of course,
debatable whether it is appropriate or wise to try to shift some of the sense of
responsibility for the outcome of a negotiation away from a party. It would
be unwise, however, to ignore psychological phenomena that might impair
clients' ability to identify the forces that are affecting them and to make
uncluttered judgments about what is in their best interests to do.
Thus, thoughtful lawyers and mediators should be aware of the
possibility that the endowment effect might be "biasing" (or acting as a drag
on) the parties' decision-making. Alert to this possibility, counsel might find
it advisable, in some circumstances, to talk directly to their clients about
what the studies have shown about the endowment effect-thereby helping
their clients understand better some of the things that might be sub-
consciously at play when they are considering various settlement options or
proposed terms. A keener self-awareness might help a party reduce the role
she permits 'fear of regret over loss' to color her thinking about how to assess
effect is described as either a resistance to trading or, more commonly, a circumstance in
which an individual person's "willing to accept" price (WTA) is greater than that same
person's "willing to pay" (WTP) price
4 See, e.g., John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,
118 Q. J. ECON. 41 (2003).
45 Arlen & Tontrup, supra note 45.
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her alternative paths forward.46
Interestingly, Arlen and Tontrup argue "that both the principal and
the agent will be debiased [when] their relationship lets them share outcome
responsibility. Both are causal for the final decision. So if people are
represented by an agent [who in fact shares outcome responsibility] in the
mediation process, the process should debias ....
I hasten to note, however, that whether a lawyer should invite her
client to re-allocate to her some of the responsibility for the outcome of a
negotiation raises more challenging ethical issues than we can address here.
Those issues would be even more daunting if it were a mediator who was
purporting to assume some of the responsibility for the outcome of the
negotiations.
3. Reactive Devaluation
"Reactive devaluation" is a cognitive trap that is well recognized in
mediation literature. 48 It occurs when a participant in a mediation "devalues"
an idea or a possible term of an agreement simply because the idea or
proposal originated in an opponent. Presumably lawyers, as well as clients,
are susceptible to this kind of potential distortion of their "objective"
judgment. If an idea is perceived as originating in a neutral source, e.g. a
mediator, there apparently is less risk of it being reactively devalued.
Knowing this, a mediator might be tempted either to try to generate a
disproportionate share of the ideas (proposals) that move across party lines,
or to present an idea (proposal) to a party as if it were hers even though the
opposing party actually was its source. Both of these courses of action are
problematic, the first imperiling the mediator's role, the second her ethics.
Neither of these potential concerns should arise, however, if a mediator
simply makes sure that parties know about this kind of cognitive trap (and
46 I hasten to add, however, that it is not clear, from the research, that merely
increasing a party's self-awareness-understanding of the endowment effect-without
more, would reduce the power of the endowment effect to 'bias' the party's valuations.
Professor Arlen warns that one "key feature of our result. . . is that the agent only mutes
the EE [endowment effect] when he assumes responsibility for the decision. Just learning
what the agent thinks is not enough . . . . He must be acting as [the owner's] agent."
E-mail from Jennifer Arlen, Professor, NYU School of Law, to author (Apr. 16, 2014)
(on file with author).
47 d
48
See Mnookin, supra note 44, at 246-47. See also Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger,
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389, 394 (1991).
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how well documented it is), and asks them to bear it in mind as they assess,
as objectively as possible, the merits of any particular proposal-regardless
of its perceived source.
One possible source of reactive devaluation is an assumption that a
proposal from an opponent must be accompanied (or inspired) by pursuit of
some hidden advantage or benefit for that party, or by some subtle downside
for the party to whom it is made. The recipient of a proposal from an
opponent might well be inclined to ask: "What's in this for them? Why are
they proposing this? What are they trying to accomplish by making this
proposal?" If such questions or concerns seem to be clouding a party's
judgment or preventing him from moving forward with a negotiation, a
mediator might consider working with the parties to address the "why"
question directly. A recipient of a proposal might be freed to assess it more
'objectively' if he could be shown a reason for it that was not threatening.
For purposes of dealing with the risk of reactive devaluation it also can
be useful to distinguish between substantive proposals (e.g., possible terms of
a settlement contract) and process ideas. If a process idea is the product of a
dialectical interchange between a mediator and one party (in caucus), it
would seem perfectly fair for the mediator to indicate that she discussed the
particular suggestion with the other side and feels that it is worthy of serious
consideration, thus both endowing it with some imprimatur and inviting an
open-minded consideration of its potential utility.
C. Behaviors Associated with the Most Successful Negotiators
In 1978, social scientist Neil Rackham published an oft-cited article
entitled "The Behaviour of Successful Negotiators."4 Mediators could use
several of Dr. Rackham's findings as support for suggestions to parties and
lawyers about how they might most productively approach the negotiation
process. The four coaching suggestions (to be made as appropriate to
participants in a mediation) that follow are based on Dr. Rackham's work.
* Move freely among issues without insisting on addressing them
in a particular sequence and without forcing linkages between
them.
* Ask more questions than you might otherwise be inclined to ask,
49
Neil Rackham & John Carlisle, The Effective Negotiator Part I: The Behaviour of
Successful Negotiators, 2 J. OF EUR. INDUST. TRAINING 6 (1978). Dr. Rackham's findings
are summarized in the 2003 edition of LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 169-81.
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and frame the questions as openly as possible-so they are real
questions, not poorly disguised arguments.
* Test your understanding more often than you might be inclined,
either through asking questions or by offering short summaries
of your perception of the status of the negotiations, of the
reasoning behind parties'positions, of matters to which parties
have agreed, etc.
* Avoid gratuitous "irritator" comments, i.e., gratuitous positive
characterizations of the speaker's own acts or proposals, e.g.,
our "generous" offer; our 'fair" or "reasonable" proposal; our
full "good faith."
Vii. DECISION ANALYSIS RECONSIDERED
This final substantive section of this paper takes the discussion of
coaching in a different direction. Instead of presenting coaching ideas that
enjoy support from social science research, this section sets forth reasons
(rooted in some measure in "science") for mediators to take special care
before deciding how to use a particular coaching tool that has gained some
currency in the mediation community.
"Decision analysis" (also known as "risk analysis") is a systematic
approach to making difficult decisions about matters that include multiple
uncertainties that has evolved in several fields over the past several decades.o
Versions of this approach have enjoyed some vogue among mediators and
lawyers for various purposes related to making settlement decisions,
assessing litigation risk, and estimating the "discounted settlement value" of
51
cases.
As presented to lawyers and mediators for use in settlement work,
50
Various forms of "decision analysis" have been propounded and elaborated over
the past twenty-five years or so, some of which seek to integrate qualitative
considerations into a broader model that includes quantitative components. The literature
on this topic is extensive, much of it originating in economics and business. See, e.g.,
PETER MCNAMEE & JOHN CELONA, DECISION ANALYSIS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL (1988).
The fourth edition appeared in 2001 and was revised in 2005. It is available electronically
from SmartOrg Inc.
51
See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTEs; EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES
FOR NEUTRALS AND ADVOCATES 165-77 (2009); Marjorie Aaron, Finding Settlements
with Numbers, Maps, and Trees, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 202 (M.
Moffitt & R. Bordone eds., 2005).
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decision analysis features an effort to disaggregate or disassemble a case or a
litigation circumstance into discrete component parts-and thus to push
settlement decision-makers away from thinking about their case and
assessing its value as if it were a unitary "blob" instead of something that
ultimately consists of a large number of separable components or elements
that need to be identified and examined carefully and independently if
something approaching a reliable understanding of the whole is to be
achieved. How far such disaggregation is extended can vary considerably,
ranging from a few major components of an action (e.g., motion for summary
judgment, liability at trial, range of damages) to a virtually limitless number
of progressively smaller (which is not to say less significant) sub-parts,
constituents, or factors. The deeper the disaggregation cuts, the more visible
the complexity of a matter becomes.
As a tool for exposing the layers of intricacy or convolution in litigation,
or the numerosity of the constituent elements of a case, decision analysis can
be very illuminating and useful.52 It can discourage the tendency to over-
simplify and can help mediators and lawyers do battle with the subterranean
power of over-confidence. Lawyers and mediators can use decision analysis
to press parties to assess their situations in lawsuits more systematically and
more thoroughly, to reduce the risk that they will overlook or ignore a
potentially significant variable or assess only superficially an element of their
case that needs appreciably closer analytical (or emotional) attention. Thus,
decision analysis can help parties and their counsel understand how many
different "risk points" a given case involves. By improving the likelihood that
counsel and clients will identify all of the major risk points, decision analysis
provides them with a more comprehensive basis for developing a general
sense of the overall quantum of risk that the case presents. In these ways, it
can amplify appreciation for the extent to which uncertainty permeates civil
litigation and, thus, for the fragility of prediction.
Because it breaks a case or a litigation circumstance into components and
invites attention to each one, decision analysis also can be a useful tool for
improving communication-from lawyer to client, across party lines, and
between mediators and other participants in a negotiation. A lawyer or
mediator can discuss each juncture or branch of a carefully drawn decision
tree to try to make sure that parties understand each element of their situation
and have a richer sense of the complexity of the constituency that makes up
52
The discussion of potentially productive uses of decision analysis in this section is
based in large part on the work of GOLANN, supra note 53.
53
See, e.g., Neale & Bazerman, supra note 14.
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the whole. And by discussing components one at a time, counsel and client
can identify places where their analysis or understanding is incomplete or
feels especially infirm.
As Dwight Golann points out, some clients are more comfortable with or
find more psychological reassurance in quantitative approaches to thinking
about problems. Some client's work lives tend to be dominated by
quantitative methods, so some may feel off center when they encounter a
kind of "analysis" that is dominated by words that seem opaque and that feel
heavy with elasticity and light on precision. Used with appropriate analytical
restraint, decision analysis could make such people feel more comfortable in
the discussions that inform negotiations. In this way, decision analysis could,
for some parties (and for some lawyers), reduce barriers to getting to a
psychological place where they can make settlement decisions.
Engaging in a decision analysis exercise also might be useful when the
roles that emotion, blame, or pursuit of retribution are playing in a mediation
seem to have exceeded appropriate or possibly constructive bounds. In such
settings, the graphics, numbers and math associated with decision analysis
could lend an air of objectivity to a negotiation, and could encourage parties
to step back a bit from a consuming feeling of intense emotional immediacy.
When they are focusing on decision tree graphics, parties may be distracted,
at least for the moment, from their anger or pain, and may turn their focus for
a moment to something other than one another, diluting obsessions with the
apparent source of their problem or distress. As Marjorie Aaron suggests, for
a few moments at least, the parties may be absorbed with the figures (in the
form of a decision tree) on a piece of paper on the table in front of them or on
a whiteboard, and for those few moments may take a break from the
emotional tempest." Such "space away" can be healthy.
In all of the ways just described, restrained use of decision analysis can
make positive contributions to a mediation dynamic. But why should the use
of this tool be restrained? And what should the restraint consist of?
The danger that lurks in at least some simple forms of decision analysis
is that parties, lawyers, or mediators might invest it with a capacity to assess,
"scientifically" and literally, the magnitude of the risk that a party faces or to
determine the "actual" settlement value of a case. This danger has multiple
sources, but its deepest roots reside in potential misuse of fundamental
54
GOLANN, supra note 53, at 163-64.
Aaron, supra note 53, at 205.
56
Among the sources of danger that are not explored in the text, the following
especially warrant mention.
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features of "probability" theory. Providing two examples will help set the
stage for discussing these dangers.
A. Example One:
Assume that the parties have identified two contested elements in a tort
case: causation and fault. Assume further that for the moment they are
limiting their use of decision analysis to trying to estimate the likelihood that
plaintiff will be able to establish liability in the defendant. In this setting, a
participant in negotiations might try to use decision analysis to make this
determination. He might reason that the likelihood that plaintiff would
establish liability can be calculated by multiplying the likelihood that the
plaintiff would prevail on the causation issue by the likelihood that the
plaintiff would prevail on the fault issue. Thus, he might contend, if the
plaintiff has a 60% chance of prevailing on causation and a 60% chance of
prevailing on fault, the plaintiff has only a 36% chance of establishing
liability: .60 (causation) x .60 (fault) = .36 (liability). While he might well
acknowledge that the accuracy of the components of this formula depend on
the quality of the information base and the judgments that inform them, this
proponent of decision analysis would argue that if these estimates are
First, probability theory is rooted largely in formal philosophy and mathematical
equations and not, principally, in controlled empirical experimentation. See IAN
HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND STATISTICAL
INFERENCE (2d ed. 1975).
Second, probability theory purports only to estimate likelihoods for events that are
repeated many, many times, not a single likelihood of the outcome of any one event. A
civil trial, of course, at least when it involves a jury, is a fundamentally un-repeatable, un-
replicable event. At a minimum, a second trial of the same case would involve a new
dynamic between lawyers, witnesses, and evidence and a different group of jurors.
Third, decision-analysts freely concede that the value of the results of any given
application of this method can be no better than the reliability of the individual
estimations that are inserted into the formulae. So, to the extent that the estimates of the
likelihoods of the events that populate the formulae are infirm or unreliable, so, too, are
the products of the multiplications.
Fourth, decision analysts also freely concede that the formulae they use generally do
not take into account many factors that can play quite significant roles in parties' thinking
about settlement, e.g., litigation transaction costs, the time-value of money, the indirect
ill-effects of involvement in litigation (e.g., distraction, stress, damage to reputation, just
to name a few), the psychological and economic tolls of uncertainty, personal or business
interests in cabining harm to relationships, or in forgiveness, or in retribution, as well as
varying levels (over time and between different parties) of risk aversion.
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accurate, multiplying them in this way yields a valid prediction of the
likelihood that plaintiff will establish liability.
B. Example Two (unrelated to example one, above):
Assume that a party estimates that the plaintiff has an 80% chance of
surviving a motion for summary judgment and a 60% chance of establishing
liability at trial. Assume further that, under his application of probability
theory, this party contends that the plaintiff has a 48% chance of emerging
from a trial as the prevailing party.
To determine the discounted settlement value of the case, our
hypothetical proponent of decision analysis would tell us that it also is
necessary to estimate the various likelihoods that the jury would award the
different possible levels of damages. Toward this end, our decision-analyst
proceeds to estimate that there is a 20% chance that the jury would return a
damages award of $200,000, a 60% chance the jury would return an award of
$120,000, and a 20% chance the jury would return an award of only $50,000.
Next, this analyst would suggest that the way to determine the probable
magnitude of a damages award (if the plaintiff were to prevail at trial) would
be to multiply each of the three possible damages figures by the separate
probability that the jury would make that particular award, then to add these
three figures. The math in this part of this exercise would look like this:
20% chance of a $200,000 verdict = $40,000
60% chance of a $120,000 verdict = $72,000
20% chance of a $50,000 verdict = $10,000
Total = $122,000
According to this decision analyst, however, the discounted settlement
value of this case is not $122,000. Rather, to determine that settlement value,
it is necessary, under this approach, to multiply this probable damages figure
by the analyst's separate estimate of the chances that the plaintiff would
emerge from a trial as the prevailing party (48%). So, as applied by this
decision analyst, the ultimate discounted settlement value of this case is .48 x
$122,000, which equals $58,560.
While many defense lawyers might find this analysis attractive, a
plaintiffs lawyer is quite likely to feel, perhaps only instinctively, that this
approach has yielded a product that bears little relation to the real world and,
therefore, must be infected by some fundamental flaw.
As it turns out, there is a high probability (to strain readers' patience) that
the plaintiffs lawyer's instinct (in this example) is informed by more than
positional bias and delusional self-interest. What might support this
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skepticism?
Our decision analyst's apparently straight-forward use of probability
theory to determine the discounted settlement value of civil cases appears to
suffer from two fundamental problems. The first is rooted in the principle
that it is appropriate, under probability theory, to multiply the separate
likelihoods that each of two events will occur in order to estimate the net
likelihood that both of those events will occur in conjunction only if the
occurrence of each event is truly independent. In civil litigation, however, the
"events" that would populate the formula that would be used to calculate
probability often are not truly independent.
For example, there often is a relationship between the likelihood that a
plaintiff will survive a motion for summary judgment and the likelihood that
the plaintiff will prevail on the liability issue at trial. In many cases, the same
or similar evidentiary variables affect the likelihood of surviving a
potentially dispositive motion and of prevailing at trial. Moreover, the size of
a damages award can be related to the likelihood that the plaintiff will prove
that the defendant is liable, e.g., how much the jury likes and believes the
plaintiff is likely to affect both the odds that she will prevail on the liability
issue and the amount of damages she will be awarded. Because some of the
same variables could have a significant effect on the likelihood of each
occurrence, we cannot say, as a matter of probability theory, that each of
these events is truly independent."
When two occurrences or events are not truly independent, we cannot
reliably use the version of probability theory that is based on multiplying the
likelihood that one event will occur by the likelihood that a second event will
occur in order to determine the likelihood that the two events will occur
conjunctively.
Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson alerts us to the second potential
difficulty with trying to use probability theory in such simple ways to
determine the discounted settlement value of civil cases. In an influential
1975 article entitled "The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts,"" Professor Nesson emphasized that in civil
litigation, legal and historical conclusions often are not conjunctive. Instead,
as he reminds us, when the law requires a plaintiff to establish several
different facts in order to prove liability, the question the law often asks the
jury to answer is not "what is the net probability that all of these facts (or
57
See HACKING, supra note 58.
58
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1985).
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events) occurred?" Similarly, when the law requires a plaintiff to prevail on
several different issues, the jury is not asked "what is the net probability of
plaintiff prevailing on all of these issues?" Stated differently, the law usually
does not impose a duty on a plaintiff to prove that the conjoined probability
of multiple events exceeds 50%, or that the conjoined probability of
prevailing on multiple issues exceeds that figure.
Instead of asking the jury to answer a question of probability theory, the
law usually asks the jury to determine, for one central factual issue at a time,
whether the plaintiff has proved the particular fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, the jury's job is to decide whether plaintiffs
contention about a particular fact is supported by 51% of the persuasive
power of the evidence that is relevant to resolving that particular factual
issue.
There may be occasions, of course, when juries get confused about what
they are being asked to do or for some other reason blur or blend what are
supposed to be separate issues or inquiries. A jury might misunderstand a
judge's instructions, or the instructions might be unclear. The risk that jurors
will blur or blend inquiries presumably is greater when courts use general
verdict forms. But any such risk would be greatly reduced when the form in
which a jury returns its verdict consists of answers to special interrogatories,
as each question asks the jury to determine separately for each material fact
whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proof. Moreover, juries are not
instructed in probability theory, and even when they blur or blend inquiries
that are separate under the law, there is no reason to assume that they purport
to apply probability theory during their deliberations. It is more likely that in
such circumstances they are relying more primitively on gestalt impressions
or their "gut" instincts.
The methods used by some decision analysts, however, seem to be
designed to assess the conjoined probability of events or facts whose
occurrence are truly independent. Thus, there seems to be a fundamental
disconnect between some simple versions of decision analysis and what
juries are asked by the law to do. To repeat: juries generally are not asked to
determine conjoined probability, and the factual issues that they are asked to
resolve separately often are not independent. Given these circumstances, it is
not at all clear how the kind of decision analysis discussed above could be
used reliably to determine the discounted settlement value of a civil case.
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The infirmity of using decision analysis to determine settlement value would seem
to be compounded if some of the determinations in a particular decision tree would be
made by a judge and others by a jury.
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What are the implications of all this for mediation coaching? As noted in
the first part of this section, mediators and other participants in negotiations
might be able to use decision analysis for any one of several different
potentially salutary purposes, but one such purpose does not seem to be to
determine reliably something denominated as the discounted settlement value
of a civil case. So a mediator should steer clear of purporting to use decision
analysis for this latter purpose, at least absent considerable explanation. And
if a party wants to introduce decision analysis into a settlement dynamic, the
mediator would be well advised to discuss the purposes of any such use with
that party in advance (and probably in private caucus). In such a setting, the
mediator probably should suggest that the purposes of a decision analysis
exercise be clearly limited and that no claims be made about the utility of
such an exercise for identifying the discounted settlement value of the case
(or, at least, that any such claims be very clearly conditioned and restrained).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The concept of coaching by mediators is neither new nor free from
controversy. One purpose of this essay has been to explore different possible
approaches to coaching (in the context of mediations) and to assess their
ethical and utilitarian implications. A more central purpose has been to cast
the net of responsibility for coaching activity much wider than it often is.
Thus, the phrase "reciprocal coaching" captures the notion that one way to
maximize the benefits that mediations can deliver is to encourage all
participants, not just the mediator, to assume responsibility for the character
and quality of the process, to think about how the health of the process would
be affected by behaviors or moves that are being considered, and, at all
stages of a mediation, to take the initiative to suggest ideas about how to
move the process forward most constructively. Toward these multiple ends,
this essay has mined social science research about negotiating, identifying
approaches, behaviors, and tools whose use the studies commend. The
ultimate goal is to expand the universe of process ideas or devices on which
all participants might draw, while enriching their thinking about which tools
or approaches might carry the most constructive promise in any given
mediation circumstance.
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